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I. INTRODUCTION
In Crawford v. Washington,' the Supreme Court remade the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to exclude all
testimonial hearsay statements made by a declarant whom the
defendant had no opportunity to confront either before or during trial.2
* Brendan Moore Professor of Advocacy and Director of Trial Competitions, Fordham
University School of Law. Thanks to participants in the Fordham Law School Faculty
Colloquium, Bennett Capers, and especially George Thomas for comments on this Article.
** Associate, Kobre & Kim LLP and Adjunct Professor of Trial Advocacy, Fordham
University School of Law.
1. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
2. Id. at 51; see also Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2531 (2009) ("In
Crawford, after reviewing the [Confrontation] Clause's historical underpinnings," the Court
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The Court therefore rejected prior law holding that confrontation is
unnecessary when a declarant's statement fits an established hearsay
exception, or is otherwise shown to be reliable by particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness.3 The Court reasoned that using the
reliability of hearsay statements as a reason for dispensing with
confrontation was incongruous with the Constitution's view that
confrontation is required to assure the reliability of testimonial hearsay.4
Since Crawford, scholars have rightly paid much attention to the
question of whether a hearsay statement is "testimonial" and thus
requires confrontation.' However, they have paid virtually no attention
to whether a statement is hearsay in the first place. Although less
frequently dispositive, that question is nonetheless important because
only out-of-court statements that are hearsay trigger the right to
confrontation.6 Statements offered for the truth of the matter asserted
require a judgment about a declarant's credibility, and it is this need for
a credibility determination that triggers the defendant's confrontation
right.7 Statements offered only for the fact that they were said, and not
offered for their truth, do not require confrontation because the
credibility of the speaker has no bearing on the probative value of the
evidence.!
This Article argues that courts violate the Confrontation Clause by
misusing the non-hearsay rubric to admit, without confrontation, two
held that the Confrontation Clause "guarantees a Defendant's right to confront those who
bear testimony against him.").
3. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). "Roberts conditioned the admissibility of all
hearsay evidence on whether it falls under a 'firmly rooted hearsay exception' or bears
'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."' Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60 (quoting Roberts,
448 U.S. at 66). The Supreme Court overruled Roberts in Crawford by "restoring the
unavailability and cross-examination requirements." Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 825
n.4 (2006); see also Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536 (rejecting the argument that the
Confrontation Clause excludes hearsay that is the product of neutral, scientific testing as
"little more than an invitation to return to our overruled decision in Roberts, which held that
evidence with 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' was admissible notwithstanding
the Confrontation Clause") (citation omitted).
4. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61-62 ("Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is
obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.
This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes.").
5. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2530; Davis, 547 U.S. at 817.
6. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60 n.9 (citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985))
("The Clause also does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than
establishing the truth of the matter asserted.").
7. Street, 471 U.S. at 414 (the confrontation right depends upon the need for cross-
examination to challenge credibility).
8. Id.
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categories of testimonial statements. The first consists of nonassertive
conduct, which, although exempt from the Federal Rules of Evidence's
(Federal Rules) definition of hearsay, is hearsay under the common law
definition that was in use when the Confrontation Clause was adopted.
Under the historical approach to confrontation, required by the Court's
opinion in Crawford, such conduct, when testimonial, requires
confrontation. Nonetheless, courts routinely admit testimonial,
nonassertive conduct without confrontation by erroneously equating it
with non-hearsay evidence that does not implicate a declarant's
credibility. In fact, such evidence implicates the declarant's credibility,
as the common law well understood. Consequently, although
nonassertive conduct is exempt from hearsay under a revised definition,
nonassertive conduct is no different from evidence that was inadmissible
hearsay at the Founding. Its admissibility without confrontation
depends exclusively upon whether it is testimonial, not whether it is
admissible under modern hearsay policy.
The second category consists of testimonial statements admitted as
non-hearsay background evidence to explain the investigators' actions,
even though the defendant has not questioned the investigators'
behavior. Courts routinely admit those statements for their "effect on
the listener" to explain the course of the investigation. They hold that
such statements raise no Confrontation Clause issue because they are
not admitted for their truth. Nonetheless, the statements' admission for
that purpose erroneously assumes that the reasons for the investigators'
actions are relevant absent the defendant's challenge. If courts admit
the statements when there is no charge of investigative misconduct to
rebut, the jury has to use them for their truth, in violation of the
defendant's confrontation right, if it considers them at all. Regardless of
whether the jury uses the statements directly as proof of what they
assert or indirectly as a basis for concluding that information available
to investigators supports the prosecution's claim of the defendant's guilt,
the jury uses the evidence for a substantive purpose, which requires
confrontation. Only when testimonial statements made to investigators
are necessary to rebut an express or implied charge that the
investigators acted improperly can courts justify their admission to
explain the investigators' behavior as a non-hearsay purpose that does
not require confrontation.
Consequently, Crawford requires a constitutionally mandated
definition of hearsay that reflects the full scope of the confrontation
right. This definition must trump the federal and state definitions that
narrow the scope of hearsay to reflect modem policy and require
20101 1417
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confrontation of testimonial, nonassertive conduct. Also, this definition
must trump judicial applications of the hearsay rule admitting
testimonial statements as non-hearsay unless they are clearly relevant to
a legitimate non-hearsay purpose. This means excluding testimonial
statements as background evidence offered to justify investigators'
conduct unless the defendant first questions it.
Part II explains the difference between declarant-centered and
assertion-centered definitions of hearsay and shows that the Federal
Rules' assertion-centered definition does not comport with the Supreme
Court's view that the Constitution excuses confrontation only when
admission of a declarant's statement does not implicate his credibility.
It argues that courts in post-Crawford cases have missed this lack of
parallelism because they conflate statements offered to show the truth
of what the declarant believes, although not what he intended to assert,
with statements not offered to show anything that the declarant
believes. Consequently, courts in many cases confuse nonassertive
conduct with evidence that is not hearsay because it is not offered to
show any matter whose truth depends upon the declarant's credibility.
Such cases also show that nonassertive conduct under the Federal Rules'
definition of hearsay is sometimes testimonial under the Court's current
definition. Testimonial, nonassertive conduct requires confrontation
unless there is specific historical support for the proposition that courts,
at the time of the Founding, exempted nonassertive conduct from
confrontation or from their understanding of hearsay evidence.
Part III argues that there is no historical evidence of a Founding-era
practice by which common law courts exempted nonassertive conduct
from the definition of hearsay or from the confrontation requirement.
Indeed, the only explicit discussion of the issue suggests that, when the
court in Wright v. Tatham9 held in 1837 that hearsay comprised
nonassertive conduct, it stated a position that it considered already
implicit in the common law definition. In any event, Wright offers no
suggestion that the court was overruling or otherwise rejecting an
established, contrary position that existed at the time of the Founding.
Without historical evidence of a practice exempting nonassertive
conduct from confrontation-equivalent to that which the Court found
sufficient to create a sui generis exemption of dying declarations -the
Sixth Amendment requires confrontation, despite subsequent changes
in the hearsay definition that reflect evolving evidence policy.
9. (1837) 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (Exch. Div.).
10. Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2684-86 (2008); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6.
1418 [93:1415
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Part IV proposes changing the basic definition of hearsay back to
that of the Founding era to include nonassertive conduct. The change
satisfies the constitutional command of the Confrontation Clause while
providing jurisdictions with the option of creating a hearsay exception
for nonassertive conduct as a matter of hearsay policy. With minimal
disruption to existing practice, the proposal ensures that all testimonial
hearsay, as understood at the Founding and not subject to
contemporaneous exception, triggers the confrontation right, while
allowing the hearsay policy of different jurisdictions to determine
whether to admit nonassertive conduct that does not implicate the
Confrontation Clause.
Adopting a hearsay exception for nonassertive conduct, rather than
excluding it from the hearsay definition, also generates collateral
benefits in cases where the confrontation right is not involved.
Admitting a declarant's nonassertive conduct pursuant to a hearsay
exception allows an opponent of that evidence to impeach the
declarant's credibility pursuant to the usual rules allowing impeachment
of hearsay declarants, a result that can only enhance the accuracy of the
fact-finding process.11 In contrast, current law imposes a double
disadvantage on the criminal defendant against whom the prosecution
offers nonassertive conduct. He has no confrontation right assuring that
he can cross-examine the declarant and, once the evidence is admitted,
no right to impeach the declarant as if he had testified.
Part V examines cases in which courts found confrontation
unnecessary because the prosecution offered testimonial statements
made to investigators only for their "effect on the listener," to explain
why investigators acted as they did, and not for their truth.'2 This Part
shows that courts routinely admit such testimonial statements for this
non-hearsay purpose although the defendant did not question the
investigators' actions. While courts correctly referenced hearsay law's
distinction between using such statements for their truth and merely for
the fact that they were heard to explain the investigators' conduct, the
same courts misapplied the non-hearsay rubric in a way that potentially
rendered the confrontation right useless. Those courts improperly
applied the "effect on listener" exception when the defendant did not
challenge the investigators' reasons for acting. Thus, the "effect on
listener" exception admits testimonial hearsay for a purpose that,
although permissible under the hearsay rule, is nonetheless irrelevant.
11. See infra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
12. See infra Part V.
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As a result, juries that choose to use it will do so for its truth-its only
relevant, though impermissible, purpose. To avoid that result, Part V
proposes that admitting testimonial hearsay for its effect on
investigators is a Confrontation Clause violation unless and until the
defendant raises an issue about the investigators' conduct. Only when
used to rebut the defendant's claim would the evidence be relevant and
permissible. Part VI concludes.
II. TESTIMONIAL, NONASSERTIVE CONDUCT
When deciding whether out-of-court statements require
confrontation, courts properly consider whether prosecutors have
offered such statements for the truth of the matter asserted.13 If not,
confrontation is unnecessary because the credibility of the declarant is
irrelevant, and there is no reason to worry that the absence of cross-
examination will undermine the evidence's reliability. The exemption
from confrontation of statements not offered for their truth is frequently
stated as a rule holding that only hearsay statements trigger the
confrontation right. Nevertheless, equating non-hearsay with
statements that the prosecution has not offered for their truth is wrong
when we consider the difference between the definition of hearsay most
prevalent today and the original common law definition retained by a
few jurisdictions.
Courts currently employ different definitions of a hearsay statement.
The most common definition is inconsistent with the Court's view that
the Constitution requires confrontation whenever the probative value of
a testimonial statement depends upon a declarant's credibility. The first
definition is "declarant-centered." Under the declarant-centered
definition, hearsay statements include any out-of-court verbal or
nonverbal conduct establishing the declarant's belief about a fact whose
relevancy depends upon the accuracy of his belief.14 This definition
comports with Crawford because it includes any statements whose
probative value depends upon a declarant's credibility.
The second definition of a hearsay statement is "assertion-centered."
It excludes statements whose probative value depends upon the
declarant's credibility if the declarant did not intend the statements "as
13. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801(c); Street, 471 U.S. at 413-14 (holding that when an out-
of-court statement is not offered to prove the truth of the matter, the Confrontation Clause is
not implicated).
14. We adopt the terms "declarant-centered" and "assertion-centered" from Professor
Roger Park's classic article "I Didn't Tell Them Anything About You": Implied Assertions as
Hearsay Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 MINN. L. REV. 783 (1990).
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an assertion" or the prosecution offers those statements for a reason
"other than the matter asserted."'" In 1975, the Federal Rules Advisory
Committee adopted the assertion-centered definition, which is now used
in most jurisdictions.'6 An assertion-centered definition establishes that
verbal or nonverbal conduct is hearsay only when the actor intends by
that conduct to assert the fact that its proponent is using it to prove.
The rationale for adopting the assertion-based test is that the sincerity
danger is reduced when a person unintentionally reveals his belief in
certain facts rather than when he intentionally asserts it, and that a
person acting on a belief, rather than merely asserting it, will ordinarily
be more careful about what he perceived or remembers.
17
Although codified in the Federal Rules and used in most states, the
assertion-based definition's exclusion of nonassertive conduct'8 from
hearsay is inconsistent with Crawford. Even proponents of the Federal
Rules' assertion-centered definition concede that nonassertive conduct
used to prove a declarant's beliefs that the proponent contends are
accurate implicates the declarant's testimonial capacities, and thus, his
credibility. They argue, however, that hearsay dangers,' 9 although not
eliminated for nonassertive conduct, are sufficiently reduced to justify
admission.' However significant to the policy debate about what the
hearsay rule should cover, this argument is irrelevant to the application
of the Confrontation Clause for the same reason that whether
testimonial hearsay fits a hearsay exception, justified by reduced hearsay
15. See FED. R. EVID. 801 & advisory committee's notes.
16. Id. The Advisory Committee makes explicit the Federal Rules' adoption of the
assertion-centered definition, noting that the "effect of the definition of 'statement' is to
exclude from the operation of the hearsay rule all evidence of conduct, verbal or nonverbal,
not intended as an assertion." Id.
17. Id. (recognizing that nonverbal conduct not intended as an assertion is "untested
with respect to the perception, memory, and narration," but finding that "these dangers are
minimal in the absence of an intent to assert and do not justify the loss of the evidence on
hearsay grounds").
18. For the sake of simplicity, this Article uses the term "nonassertive conduct" to
include assertive conduct that is offered for something other than its intended inference.
19. See Park, supra note 14, at 785 n.15. Park attributes the phrase "hearsay dangers" to
Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV.
L. REV. 177 (1948). Morgan identified sincerity, misuse of language (sometimes called
ambiguity or narration), perception, and memory as the four "dangers." Id. at 185-88.
20. Meanwhile, proponents of the declarant-centered definition argue that the reduction
of the sincerity, memory, and perception dangers, if any, is overstated or counteracted by an
increased danger of ambiguity when the jury attempts to infer the declarant's beliefs from
actions not intended to communicate them. RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., EVIDENCE: TExT,
PROBLEMS, AND CASES 450-51 (4th ed. 2006).
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dangers, is irrelevant.2 Under Crawford and its progeny, whether
testimonial hearsay is reliable-as previously shown by its qualification
under a firmly rooted hearsay exception-has no bearing on its
admissibility without confrontation. 23  The reliability argument for
excluding nonassertive conduct from the definition of hearsay can have
no greater significance than the reliability argument for excusing
confrontation when hearsay fits a firmly rooted hearsay exception.
Federal Rule 801(a) defines "statement" for purposes of the hearsay
rule as "(1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a
person, if it is intended.., as an assertion." This definition rejects the
declarant-centered definition.4 It excludes nonassertive conduct from
hearsay even if that conduct is used as a basis from which to infer a
declarant's beliefs about facts that the proponent seeks to prove with
the evidence that the declarant believes them. 25  A classic example is
evidence that a sea captain sailed with his family after subjecting the
21. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2539 (2009) (admissibility without
confrontation turns on whether a particular statement is testimonial, not whether it fits a
hearsay exception, even one that usually encompasses non-testimonial statements); Crawford
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61-64 (2004) (admitting reliable hearsay statements "is
fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation" because the clause "is a procedural
rather than a substantive guarantee ... command[ing] . . . that reliability be assessed in a
particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination").
22. The Court had previously held that the Confrontation Clause does not bar admission
of a non-testifying witness's statement against a criminal defendant if the statement possessed
"adequate 'indicia of reliability."' Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). To meet that test,
evidence was required to either fall within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" or bear
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." id.
23. In overruling Roberts, the Crawford Court noted the problems with the previously
articulated test:
Although the results of our decisions have generally been faithful to
the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause, the same cannot be said
of our rationales. Roberts conditions the admissibility of all hearsay
evidence on whether it falls under a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" or
bears "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." This test departs
from the historical principles identified above in two respects. First, it is
too broad: It applies the same mode of analysis whether or not the
hearsay consists of ex parte testimony. This often results in close
constitutional scrutiny in cases that are far removed from the core
concerns of the Clause. At the same time, however, the test is too narrow:
It admits statements that do consist of ex parte testimony upon a mere
finding of reliability. This malleable standard often fails to protect against
paradigmatic confrontation violations.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60 (internal citation omitted).
24. See FED. R. EVID. 801(a).
25. See id.
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ship to a thorough inspection, as proof that the vessel was seaworthy.26
The authors of the Federal Rules decided that, although such evidence
implicated the captain's credibility and was subject to the hearsay
dangers of misperception, faulty memory, ambiguous narration and
insincerity, the reduced dangers associated with nonassertive conduct
justified its exclusion from hearsay. 27
To the extent the sea captain did not intend to communicate to
anyone the seaworthiness of the vessel, his actions would likely show his
sincere beliefs about the condition of the ship. When intentionally
communicating the condition of the ship to another, he would decide
whether to report sincerely, creating the possibility that he chose to
mislead. When acting upon, rather than communicating, his belief, he
will be sincere, except in the unlikely event that he somehow lies to
himself. Also, acting on his belief about the ship's seaworthiness by
risking the lives of himself and his family, the captain is more likely to
be careful about his perception and memory of the ship's condition than
he is when he merely reports the ship's condition to another.
Meanwhile, hearsay dangers remain. There is no certain way to
determine that the captain did not intend to communicate his belief
about the ship, in which case the danger of insincerity, although hidden,
remains. Although his conduct is not the type ordinarily thought of as
intending an assertion, the captain may have intended to dupe observers
into thinking the ship was safe. Perception and memory dangers also
remain. The inspection may have missed a flaw, or the captain may
have misunderstood or forgotten the flaws that made the ship
unseaworthy. Moreover, that the conduct is nonassertive may actually
increase the narration danger because we infer the captain's beliefs
about the seaworthiness of the ship from actions that are ambiguous
precisely because the captain did not intend his actions to communicate
those beliefs. Perhaps leaving with his family after the inspection
showed his belief that the ship's many flaws made it an appropriate
26. Park, supra note 14, at 789-90 (citing Wright v. Tatham, (1837) 112 Eng. Rep. 488,
516 (Exch. Div.) (Parke, B.)); EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 250, at
738 (3d ed. 1984); 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 267,
at 103 (rev. ed. 1979).
27. FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee's notes ("No class of evidence is free of
the possibility of fabrication, but the likelihood is less with nonverbal than with assertive
verbal conduct."); cf Park, supra note 14, at 791 ("The literature ... lacks any compelling
evidence of injustice done by receiving nonverbal conduct containing concealed assertions.
The opponents of nonverbal conduct have not found their Sir Walter Raleigh.").
2010] 1423
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vehicle for teaching them the perils of venturing to sea on a dangerous
vessel.
The Federal Rules' advisory committee's notes make it perfectly
clear that the rule writers understood that they were exempting
nonassertive conduct from the definition of hearsay although such
conduct required a judgment about the declarant's credibility." The
committee also applied a similar argument to assertive conduct offered
for some reason other than its intended assertion, using the classic
example provided in Wright v. Tatham.9  To help establish the
competency of a testator (Marsden), the beneficiary of his will offered
letters written to Marsden in language and about matters that suggested
the writers' belief that Marsden was a person of ordinary understanding
and thus competent to write his will.3° The beneficiary did not offer the
letters for the truth of their intended assertions about what they
reported-news of mutual friends, descriptions of an author's travels, a
request that Marsden settle a legal dispute, and an offer to remain in a
post to which Marsden had appointed the writer-but rather as a basis
for inferring the writers' beliefs that Marsden was capable of
understanding and responding to their letters. Though the advisory
committee acknowledged that the Court of the Exchequer Chamber
excluded the letters as hearsay, the committee rejected that result to the
extent that the letter writers unintentionally revealed-rather than
intentionally asserted-their belief in Marsden's competency. Were the
letter writers acting on their belief in the testator's mental state while
having no intention to communicate that belief, the evidence would be
subject to the same reduced hearsay dangers that accompany
nonassertive conduct.
The Wright court confusingly called the letters "implied statements.,31
The label elided indirect, though intended, assertions-matters the
declarant left to implication, though intentionally communicated-with
28. FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee's notes.
29. Wright, 112 Eng. Rep. at 488-89.
30. Id. at 489.
31. Wright, 112 Eng. Rep. at 516-17. The Wright court wrote:
[P]roof of a particular fact, which is not of itself a matter in issue, but
which is relevant only as implying a statement or opinion of a third person
on the matter in issue, is inadmissible in all cases where such a statement
or opinion not on oath would be of itself inadmissible.
Id. Before the advent of the Federal Rules, courts considered such implied assertions to be
hearsay. See, e.g., Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 442 (1949); United States v.
Pacelli, 491 F.2d 1108, 1115-17 (2d Cir. 1974); Favre v. Henderson, 464 F.2d 359, 362 (5th Cir.
1972); United States v. Williamson, 450 F.2d 585, 590 (5th Cir. 1971).
[93:14151424
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beliefs unintentionally revealed while the speaker intentionally asserts
something else.32 Wright's holding addresses only the situation where the
declarant's beliefs are inferred, but not intentionally asserted, because the
assertion-centered definition already encompasses intentional assertions,
however indirect or even cryptic.33 Nonetheless, confusion about the
scope of "implied statements" led some courts to read the Federal Rules'
rejection of Wright to allow indirect, intended assertions to escape the
hearsay definition; this is a result for which nobody offered justification.'
In turn, this created distrust of the Federal Rules' hearsay definition deep
enough to cause some courts and commentators to question whether they
should not interpret the Federal Rules' assertion-centered approach as no
narrower than Wright's declarant-centered approach.35
Nonetheless, Professor Roger Park, in a 1990 article, set things
straight. Park clearly explained the difference between the properly
understood definitions and isolated several categories of evidence where
the different definitions spawned different results despite some courts
and commentators' contrary wishes. Park defended the Federal Rules'
approach against other commentators' attempts to restore the hearsay
definition to its pre-Federal Rules condition.
3 6
This Article's thesis does not require us to enter the debate about
which approach is preferable because the occasion for revisiting the
contrasting definitions is to decide the scope of the historically
determined confrontation right, and not the policy-determined hearsay
definition. Nonetheless, Professor Park's description of evidence for
which the definitions make a difference provides a useful template for
post-Crawford cases in which courts applying the assertion-centered
definition deviated from the common law. In so doing, those courts
exempt from confrontation evidence whose probative value depends
upon an absent declarant's credibility.
Under the Federal Rules, perhaps the most important category of
non-hearsay that raises a confrontation problem is that of false
32. Christopher B. Mueller, Post-Modern Hearsay Reform: The Importance of
Complexity, 76 MINN. L. REV. 367,419 n.153 (1992).
33. Park, supra note 14, at 800 (the assertion-based definition incorporates all facts that
a speaker intended to communicate, whether directly or indirectly).
34. Id. at 794-801 (discussing misuses of the assertion-based definition). Stoddard v.
State illustrates almost all these misuses by arguing that questions, commands, and statements
of fact requiring a "multi-step inferential process" from the fact asserted to the proposition
for whose truth the statement is offered cannot be hearsay. 850 A.2d 406, 410-26 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2004), rev'd, 887 A.2d 564 (Md. 2005).
35. Park, supra note 14, at 787 n.20.
36. See id.
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statements uttered to investigators by a defendant's associate which the
prosecution offers to show the declarant's knowledge that the defendant
is guilty. 7 Such cases occur frequently, and because courts properly find
the evidence to be non-hearsay under the assertion-centered definition,
they improperly deny defendants their right to confront the declarants.
In this circumstance, declarants unintentionally reveal their knowledge
of the defendant's guilt while intending to communicate something
exculpatory, which the government then proves is false. When persons
who are aware of the defendant's criminal involvement (or lack thereof)
speak falsely to mislead investigators, courts rightly conceive these
statements as non-hearsay under Federal Rule 801. Occasionally, courts
make the proper argument: such statements are assertive conduct
offered for a purpose other than their intended assertions and therefore
fall outside the Federal Rules' assertion-centered definition of hearsay.
Unfortunately, courts more frequently follow a poorly reasoned
Supreme Court case, Anderson v. United States.39  There, the Court
confusedly analyzed false statement evidence revealing a declarant's
unsuccessfully disguised beliefs of his and the defendant's guilt-hearsay
under the declarant-centered, but not the assertion-centered
definition-as if it were not hearsay under any definition because it was
not offered to prove the truth of any matter believed by the declarant.'
37. Id. at 814-16 (citing White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 603-04 (9th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Candoli, 870 F.2d 496, 507-08 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Munson, 819 F.2d 337,
339-40 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Hackett, 638 F.2d 1179, 1186-87 (9th Cir. 1980);
United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1353-54 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Weaver,
565 F.2d 129, 135-36 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Kelly, 551 F.2d 760, 764-65 (8th Cir.
1977); United States v. Cusumano, 429 F.2d 378, 381 (2d Cir. 1970)). After Crawford,
admission of the statements in each of these cases without confrontation would violate the
Confrontation Clause.
38. Park, supra note 14, at 836-37.
[C]ourts seem to have used the concepts of nonassertive conduct, and of
assertive conduct offered to prove something other than the matter
asserted, in a manner consistent with the Advisory Committee's theory
that sincerity dangers are lessened. The cases generally involve utterances
classed as non-hearsay that raise no real insincerity dangers affecting the
purpose for which they are being used.... It is unlikely that codefendants
who made false statements exculpating their accomplices were hoping to
incriminate their accomplices.
Id.
39. 417 U.S. 211 (1974).
40. Id. at 219-20. Professor Park explains that Anderson has little precedential value
because of "the obscure way the Court stated the facts and ... the Court's apparent belief
that it was using the statement in a way that involved no reliance on credibility and hence no
need for cross-examination." Park, supra note 14, at 815 & n.175. Nonetheless, other courts
DEFINING HEARSAY
In Anderson, the Court received a declarant's false statements made to
cover up the crime and used against an accomplice to show
consciousness of their joint guilt.4' Yet, when used to show the truth of
what the declarant thought, the false statement was clearly hearsay
under the declarant-centered definition because it implicated the
speaker's credibility.42
When the question is whether the evidence is hearsay under the
Federal Rules, the correct rubric for deciding that the false statement
evidence is not hearsay does not matter, except perhaps to law
professors. But when the issue is whether the Constitution requires
confrontation, it makes all the difference. Applying the correct analysis
shows that while the evidence is not hearsay under the assertion-based
definition, it is hearsay under the common law's declarant-centered
view, thereby implicating the declarant's credibility and thus triggering
the defendant's confrontation right. A Massachusetts appeals court in
the recent case of Commonwealth v. Pelletier43 seemed to suspect as
much. In Pelletier, the court cited Anderson, while holding that a wife's
false statement that she received her injuries when she fell down the
stairs, offered against her defendant-husband accused of battery, was
not hearsay and raised no confrontation issue because the prosecution
did not offer it for its truth." The court qualified its ruling by noting
that the defendant had not argued in his brief that the statement was
"implied hearsay," so under Massachusetts appellate procedure, there
was no need to address that issue or "the extent to which the principles
of the hearsay rule and the confrontation clause are coextensive." 5 The
have repeated its error. See, e.g., Hackett, 638 F.2d at 1186 (arguing that false statements to
prove consciousness of guilt "were admitted not for their truth, but merely for the fact that
the statements were made"). By contrast, that beliefs unintentionally revealed by false
statements were hearsay under the declarant-centered definition was forcibly argued in Lyle
v. Koehler, 720 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1983). In that case, the declarant solicited false testimony
providing himself and an accomplice with a false alibi. Id. Although one might argue that the
defendant's guilt was intentionally asserted by the declarant's request for the false alibi
(rather than by the declarant's simply providing the defendant with one), the court assumed
that the request unintentionally revealed the defendant's guilt. Id. Nonetheless, the court
found the statement hearsay and its admission a violation of the Confrontation Clause. Id.
41. 417 U.S. at 219-20.
42. Id. at 220; see also Park, supra note 14, at 801 & n.79 (false statements as evidence of
consciousness of guilt require a judgment about the declarant's credibility).
43. 879 N.E.2d 125 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008).
44. Id. The court carefully noted that the "wife's statement was not being offered to
prove the truth of anything asserted therein," reserving the question of whether the statement
was nonetheless "implied hearsay" when offered for the truth of beliefs that she had not
intended to assert. Id. at 130 & n.6 (emphasis added).
45. Id.
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court's disclaimer indicated that it understood that the prosecution's
offer of the statements to show them false did not determine whether
they were hearsay under the declarant-centered definition when the
prosecution proved their falsity to show the declarant's knowledge of
the defendant's guilt. It simply will not do to suggest, as did the court in
United States v. Trala,46 that Crawford does not apply to a declarant's
false statements when offered to show his knowledge of the defendant's
guilt "because the reliability of testimonial evidence is not at issue.
4
1
That is plainly false. At the very least, the declarant's perception,
memory, and narration, and thus credibility, are squarely implicated
when the prosecution uses false statement evidence in this fashion.
Also, the reduction in the sincerity danger is only as good as our
estimate that the declarant was not deviously intending to inculpate the
defendant by falsely exculpating him.
The Pelletier court sensed the correct issues, while avoiding them for
procedural reasons, but other courts have simply deprived defendants of
their confrontation right without realizing the error of conflating the
scope of the Federal Rules' assertion-centered hearsay definition and
the confrontation right. For example, in United States v. Brown,4 8 the
government offered the statement of Brown's co-defendant, Giles, to
airport police explaining his possession of $23,000 in cash as the profits
of his barbershop that he intended to use for the purchase of a vehicle. 9
The government proved the statement false, while offering it against
Brown, who was traveling with Giles and was also in possession of a
large amount of cash." The court held that Giles's statement was not
hearsay, and thus did not raise any confrontation issue, because it was
not "introduced for the truth of the matter asserted, but to show that he
was lying."51 Still, it was not hearsay only under the assertion-centered
definition because the prosecution did not offer it for the truth of the
intended assertion, that is, that the money was barbershop profits to be
used to buy a car. 2 The prosecution did prove the lie to show the truth
of the declarant's belief that the source and purpose of the cash that
Brown and Giles were carrying needed to be hidden from the police
because the cash's source and purpose were illegal. Under the
46. 386 F.3d 536, 544-45 (3d Cir. 2004).
47. Id. at 544.
48. 560 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2009).
49. Id. at 765.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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declarant-centered definition, the lie was clearly hearsay because the
prosecution offered it for the truth of Giles's belief that they needed a
false explanation for the drug money, although his lie unintentionally
revealed that belief, rather than intentionally asserted it.
Similarly in United States v. Thompson,53 the court held that
admission of two declarants' false statements about paying a contractor
for paving their driveway raised no hearsay or Confrontation Clause
issues despite the statements having been made to (and recorded by)
police and then repeated in the grand jury.' The government
introduced the evidence to show that "county-purchased materials were
being used to improve private property," and, ultimately, to prove that
the defendants were guilty of misappropriating government property by
arranging to pave the declarants' driveway.5 Although the government
plainly used the declarants' beliefs that they had no right to the
materials to prove that the declarants did not own them, the court
erroneously reasoned that "there is no need to assess the credibility of
the declarant of a false statement" and so "the Confrontation [C]lause is
not implicated."56 By now, it should be apparent why that is wrong. The
statements' probative value depended upon the accuracy of the
declarants' belief that they were not entitled to use these materials
(implicating perception and memory dangers) and on the accuracy of
the inference that lying about paying for the paving showed guilty
knowledge of the materials' ownership rather than something else
(implicating narration dangers).
Finally, in United States v. Blake,57 the government proved that the
defendant's wife had told police during a search that money found in the
Blakes' safe had come from the sale of electronics equipment. 8 The
court allowed this statement to be used against the defendant because it
was not "offered for the truth of the matter asserted (that the money
came from electronics sales), but, rather, to show that the Blakes'
inconsistent answers to the questions about the money supported the
government's claim that the money came from the sale of illegal
drugs."59  That inference required the jury to find Mrs. Blake's
explanation false, implicating Mr. Blake with her knowledge that he
53. Crim. No. 07-35-GFVT, 2009 WL 331478 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 9, 2009).
54. Id.
55. Id. at *3-4.
56. Id. at *4.
57. 284 F. App'x 530 (10th Cir. 2008).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 541.
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needed a phony explanation for the source of the drug money.60 Again,
the court conflated the Federal Rules hearsay and Confrontation Clause
questions, finding no Confrontation Clause issue because the evidence
was not hearsay under Federal Rule 801.
False statements made to police are particularly important examples
of nonassertive hearsay because their status as testimonial seems clear.
Indeed, if a declarant's credibility defines the scope of the
Confrontation Clause, the only way to avoid the conclusion that
Crawford does not require courts to use a declarant-centered definition
of hearsay would be to argue that, by happy coincidence, all evidence
excluded from hearsay by the "intent to assert" requirement is not
testimonial. That possibility is remote, though not impossible. If the
Supreme Court were eventually to find that testimonial statements
encompass only those in which a declarant intended to communicate the
facts that the prosecution offered the statements to prove, then the
definition of "testimonial" would exclude the same evidence excluded
from hearsay by the assertion-centered test. But the Court has not yet
applied, or even suggested, such a narrow view of what is testimonial.
Thus far, to determine whether a declarant's statements are
testimonial, courts have focused upon such formulations as whether the
statement was made "under circumstances which would lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be
available for use at a later trial" or, if made in response to police
interrogation, whether circumstances "objectively indicate that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution., 61 These definitions
render it nearly certain that the declarants' statements in all the false
statement cases are testimonial, although meeting only the declarant-
centered definition of hearsay. The declarants knew very well that they
were making statements that could be used prosecutorially and would
be available for use in a subsequent trial. Moreover, the primary
purpose of the questioning to which they responded was to discover past
events potentially relevant to criminal prosecution. The only questions
60. See id.
61. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004); see also Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2531-33 (2009); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 813
(2006); United States v. Arnold, 486 F.3d 177, 187-92 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Ellis,
460 F.3d 920, 923-24 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Maher, 454 F.3d 13, 21 (lst Cir. 2006);
United States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355, 358-60 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Cromer, 389
F.3d 662, 673-74 (6th Cir. 2004); United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 228-29 (2d Cir. 2004);
United States v. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1121-22 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
1430 [93:1415
DEFINING HEARSAY
are whether it matters that the declarants did not anticipate the
statements would be used in the way the prosecution seeks to use them,
or whether they did not intend the statements to be inculpatory at all.
The Court's recent opinion in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,62 where
it held that the Sixth Amendment requires confrontation of a police
chemist who prepared a report showing that the substance possessed by
the defendant was cocaine, strongly suggests that neither factor is
determinative.63
First, the Court rejected the argument that statements need be
"accusatory" to be testimonial.' 4  When the prosecution offers a
declarant's statements for their truth, the declarant is a witness against
the defendant, even though the substance of the statements is hardly
necessary to convict. 6' According to the Court, the Constitution
contemplates only two categories of witness: those against and those in
favor of the defendant. There is no "third category of witnesses, helpful
to the prosecution, but somehow immune from confrontation" because
the evidence the witness provides is insufficiently inculpatory or his
relationship with the defendant is not adversarial. 6 Under Melendez-
Diaz, if the prosecution offered a chemist's report saying that a tested
sample belonging to a person other than the defendant was negative for
contraband to rebut the defendant's suggestion that it contaminated the
defendant's sample with illegal drugs, the report would be no less
hearsay than that of the original chemist's statement that the
defendant's sample tested positive for illegal drugs.
Second, there is no suggestion that because a witness may
unwittingly spill the beans, whether in response to police interrogation
or when voluntarily speaking to investigators in an attempt to mislead
them, the statements made during the attempt to mislead are not
testimonial.67 The Court said, "[C]onfrontation is designed to weed out
not only the fraudulent [witness], but the incompetent one as well." 68
62. 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2542 (2009).
63. See id.
64. Id. at 2533-34.
65. See id. at 2534.
66. Id. Even if there were a requirement that the statements be sufficiently inculpatory,
false statements will often meet it because, however unintentionally, they provide damning
proof.
67. Id. at 2535 ("[N]o authority... hold[s] that a person who volunteers his testimony is
any less a witness against the defendant than one who is responding to interrogation.")
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
68. Id. at 2537.
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Thus, even if nonassertive conduct raises no sincerity danger,
confrontation is nonetheless required to probe the witness's other
testimonial capacities and to expose unreliable testimony of all stripes.
Finally, given the Court's repeated description of grand jury
testimony and affidavits as core instances of testimonial statements, it is
hard to imagine how they become non-testimonial when offered to
prove something that the declarant did not intend to assert.69 It seems
no more likely that the Court would find statements made to police and
in the grand jury not testimonial because the speaker unwittingly
revealed damaging information about the defendant, than it would hold
that a witness was not testifying when he did the same thing in court.
Routine instructions tell jurors to evaluate not only what witnesses say,
but how they say it.7" What is demeanor evidence if not a series of
verbal and nonverbal clues that reveal, often unwittingly, what the
witness actually believes? What a witness lets slip is as much a part of
his live testimony as that which he intends to communicate, and seeing
why it should or how it could be otherwise with out-of-court statements
is exceedingly difficult.7'
A second important category of nonassertive conduct is illustrated
by United States v. Zenni.72 In that classic case, the court admitted
evidence that, while searching the premises of an alleged bookmaker,
the police received calls in which anonymous callers attempted to place
bets." Relying on the Federal Rules' rejection of Wright v. Tatham,
under which the calls would be declarant-centered hearsay,74 the Zenni
69. Id. at 2531-32 (affidavits and prior testimony are testimonial).
70. See, e.g., 4 LEONARD SAND ET AL, MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-
CIVIL § 76.01 (2007) (Instruction 76-1).
How do you determine where the truth lies? You watched each witness
testify. Everything a witness said or did on the witness stand counts in
your determination. How did the witness impress you? Did he appear to
be frank, forthright and candid, or evasive and edgy as if hiding
something? How did the witness appear; what was his demeanor-that is,
his carriage, behavior, bearing, manner and appearance while testifying?
Often it is not what a person says but how he says it that moves us.
Id.
71. The entire notion of "testimonial" hearsay is built on the idea that the Constitution
requires like treatment of witnesses who testify against the defendant at trial and those who
"bear testimony" against the defendant in out-of-court statements.
72. 492 F. Supp. 464 (E.D. Ky. 1980).
73. Id. at 465.
74. The Zenni court was prescient about the hearsay status of such calls under the
common law. In Regina v. Kearley, [1992] 2 AC 228 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.),
relying on Wright, the House of Lords found anonymous calls ordering drugs on premises
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court determined that they were not hearsay under the assertion-based
definition. Many courts have followed suit, though Zenni is not without
its critics.75
At one point, the court treated the case as though the calls trying to
place bets were pure nonassertive conduct equivalent to the ship
captain's actions, stating that "the utterance, 'Put $2 to win on Paul
Revere in the third at Pimlico,' is a direction and not an assertion of any
kind, and therefore can be neither true nor false."76  The analysis
ignored the way in which virtually all communication has some intended
assertion associated with it, which should cause us to understand the
utterance above to assert, "I want to place a $2 bet with you on Paul
Revere in the third at Pimlico." 77 Read that way, the caller is effectively
asserting his belief that bets are taken on the premises at the same time
that the act of calling and placing the bet is (perhaps) unintentionally
being searched by police to be hearsay. In 2003, Parliament enacted comprehensive hearsay
reform whose effect was to exclude such calls from the definition of hearsay. See infra note
113.
75. See, e.g., State v. Kutz, 2003 WI App 205, $ 45-46, 671 N.W.2d 660. Believing that
the bettors implicitly intended to assert that bets were taken on the premises, the court wrote:
[W]e are not persuaded by the analysis in Zenni ... because that analysis
assumes without explanation that an assertion does not include an
intended expression of a fact, opinion, or condition if it is implicit in the
words used. Moreover, the court in Zenni acknowledged that some
utterances might be intended as an assertion even though the "words
[were] non-assertive in form" and such utterances would require a
preliminary determination of intent: for example, an airport security
inspector that says "go on through" to a passenger after using a metal
detector on them might intend to assert that the passenger did not have a
gun. Zenni, 492 F. Supp. at 469 n.21. We also observe that, even when
treatises describe the rule in federal courts to be that implicit assertions
are not hearsay, they often point out exceptions. See, e.g., MCCORMICK
ON EVIDENCE, supra [note 25], § 250, at 111-12 n.29 (noting in a
footnote, that when the utterance "it will stop raining in an hour" is
offered to prove it is raining, that is hearsay, because "the fact to be
proved is a necessary implication of the utterance").
We conclude that the preferable approach is to include within the
meaning of "assertion" in Wis. Stat. § 908.01(1) an expression of a fact,
opinion, or condition that is implicit in the words of an utterance as long
as the speaker intended to express that fact, opinion, or condition.
Id.
76. Zenni, 492 F. Supp. at 466 n.7.
77. Elsewhere, the Zenni court acknowledged that the callers' unstated belief that bets
were taken at that number was excluded from hearsay only if they did not intend to
communicate their belief. Id. at 468-69 & n.21.
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revealing the same thing.' That does not necessarily make the evidence
hearsay under the Federal Rules, but it puts it in the more problematic
category of "assertive conduct not offered for its intended assertion,"
like the conduct in Wright.
79
Properly analyzed, Zenni is more problematic than the false
statement cases where the beliefs revealed and asserted by the
declarant's words are effective opposites, offering an assurance that,
when we use the words to establish inferences from their falsity, they are
free of any intent to assert. In contrast, when we use the calls to show
the callers' beliefs that gambling occurs on the premises, but not their
desire to place a bet, we cannot be nearly so sure that the inference is
free of an intent to assert the beliefs we are using it to prove. This has
moved some courts to find the calls hearsay, even under the Federal
Rules, after weighing the extent to which the callers' beliefs about the
premises are unintentionally revealed versus intentionally asserted.
Nonetheless, most courts have opted to call this type of evidence
non-hearsay under the Federal Rules' assertion-centered definition,
raising the possibility that confrontation is nonetheless required because
the proof is hearsay under the declarant-centered view. In many cases,
such evidence will not be testimonial because the callers will not know
that they are speaking to authorities or, if they do, will be unlikely to
place bets or ask for drugs. But in other cases, such calls can be
testimonial. Weems v. State provides a recent example of how this can
occur.80 In Weems, several persons approached a residence where
narcotics officers were executing a search warrant and asked for the
defendant by his nickname. The court held that the requests to see the
defendant were "verbal acts not introduced for their truth but rather to
connect Weems to the residence and the cocaine seized from that
location."8' The court went on to say that the verbal act designation also
meant that there was no Confrontation Clause violation because "the
Clause does not bar the admission of statements for purposes other than
establishing the truth of the matter asserted."'
78. Professors Mueller and Kirkpatrick profitably discuss Zenni and similar borderland
problems as cases of "mixed act and assertion" requiring judges to weigh the conduct's
performative and assertive aspects. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE: PRACTICE UNDER THE RULES § 8.22 (3d ed. 2009).
79. Park, supra note 14, at 800-01.
80. 673 S.E.2d 50 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).
81. Id. at 54.
82. Id. at 53 n.2.
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Such evidence is hearsay under the declarant-centered view even if it
is not hearsay under the assertion-centered definition because the
declarants were mostly revealing, not asserting, their beliefs that the
defendant could be found there. Either way, the probative value of
their statements clearly depends upon their credibility. Any residual
confusion about whether such evidence would be hearsay under the
declarant-centered view follows from the Weems court's confusing use
of the term "verbal act" for assertive conduct offered for a purpose
other than its intended assertion.
The term "verbal act" is better reserved for evidence that is not
hearsay because its occurrence is probative despite the actor's beliefs.'
A classic example is a statement assenting to a contract while the
speaker secretly refuses to be bound. Where the law makes the
speaker's verbalized assent probative on the issue of whether he
concluded a binding contract, despite his unexpressed reservations, the
assent is a verbal act. A true verbal act is relevant merely by virtue of its
having been spoken and is not hearsay under either the assertion-
centered or declarant-centered definitions. In Weems, however, asking
for the defendant at a particular location is probative of the fact that he
can be found there because it shows the declarant's belief that the
defendant can be found there. Unlike the classic verbal act, the
probative value of the proof depends on the declarant's credibility,
implicating, at the least, his perception and memory that the defendant
hangs out there. The proof is not exempted from hearsay because it is a
verbal act making the truth of any matter irrelevant. It is not hearsay
only under the assertion-centered view because the declarant's beliefs
about the defendant's whereabouts are not intentionally asserted, but
rather unintentionally revealed by the declarant asking for him there.
Weems was not entirely clear about whether the persons asking for
the defendant by his nickname knew they were speaking to police. At
one point, the court described steps that the officers took to disguise
themselves on the premises, which resulted in their arresting several
persons who came to the door asking for drugs and the defendant.8 But
when the court analyzed the statements of the persons asking for the
83. Park, supra note 14, at 833. Professor Park notes that the term "verbal act" is
unobjectionable if it is reserved for circumstances when the act of uttering words has legal
consequences. The label creates problems, however, when courts use it to refer to verbal
conduct that is not hearsay because it is nonassertive, but is not legally operative language.
Such conduct involves hearsay dangers. Id.
84. Weems, 673 S.E.2d at 52.
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defendant, it made no reference to the requests for drugs.85 This
suggests that some of the callers arriving at the door may have arrived
after the police revealed themselves and simply asked for the defendant
without revealing their (possibly illegal) purpose. Even if these were
not the facts of Weems, this scenario clearly illustrates how we can
expect declarants in cases besides the false statement cases to engage in
nonassertive conduct that implicates defendants, even in the presence of
police. Similar cases will undoubtedly include those where the speakers
know that they are talking to police because the nonassertive conduct
that connects a defendant to illegality need not inculpate the speaker.
Asking for Weems by nickname associates him with the location at
which the drugs were found, despite whether the visitors gave any
reason at all for coming, or innocently identified themselves as there to,
say, chat about the Yankees or take the defendant to tea.
Like the false statements, the nonassertive conduct associating the
defendant with the drug location is not exempt from being testimonial
because the prosecution uses it in unanticipated ways or because it is not
accusatory, sufficiently inculpatory, or adversarial."' But there is a
difference that may matter. The actors whose conduct connects the
defendant to illegality are less likely to anticipate that they are giving
evidence at all, even if their actions are knowingly undertaken in the
presence of police. The declarants of false statements are fully aware
that they are providing information to the authorities that they may use
as evidence, making that information the functional equivalent of live
testimony.
The statements associating a person with illegality that fit the
nonassertive conduct rubric are harder to conceive as functional
testimony. The declarant of such nonassertive conduct, like the
declarant who asks the police for Weems, should not be thinking at all
about providing evidence. If a person is aware that he is potentially
providing evidence to the police, rather than just acting in their
presence, his statement should probably no longer qualify as
nonassertive conduct. It thus remains an open question whether the
Court will want to make clear that the inquiry into whether a declarant
would understand that statements made to police can be "used
prosecutorially" and "would be available for use in a subsequent trial"
should include an inquiry into whether the declarant likely understood
85. Id. at 53-54.
86. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
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that he was providing evidence at all. 87 Nonetheless, the central point
remains that the Weems court never asked whether Weems's visitors'
statements were testimonial because it erroneously assumed that the
assertion-centered definition of hearsay determined the extent of
Weems's confrontation right.
Some statements that courts find fit the mold of non-hearsay
''connecting" statements will undoubtedly remain testimonial.
Washington v. McKinney provides an example. 88 The defendant was
charged with dealing drugs. She admitted using, but denied dealing,
drugs. She instead claimed that her boyfriend, who used her cell phone,
was dealing.89 While detaining McKinney, the police had answered a
call on her cell phone in which Crystal Donovan complained that she
had been waiting for McKinney to bring her drugs in the parking lot
outside a hotel.' After receiving Donovan's description, the officer who
had answered the phone offered to bring the drugs.91 Subsequently, a
uniformed officer approached Donovan in the parking lot.9' Donovan
volunteered to the officer that she was there to meet McKinney, whom
she described as her friend.9' When the officer asked Donovan why she
was meeting McKinney, she said first, that she was going to give
McKinney a ride, and later, that she wanted to hang out with her.94 The
court held that Donovan's statements were not hearsay because they
were not offered for their truth, but rather to show "that Donovan knew
McKinney and that McKinney was nearby at the Sunrise Motel." 95 The
87. Other circumstances raising this issue include the flight or suicide of the subject of an
investigation, or his destruction of evidence, when the subject knows that the police are
investigating him. Courts have admitted these actions as nonassertive conduct revealing the
subject's knowledge of the unlawful nature of the activities for which he was being
investigated or the incriminating nature of the materials destroyed, which knowledge may
then be admissible against others connected to those activities or materials. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Colson, 490 A.2d 811, 824 (Pa. 1985) (suicide of defendant's accomplice
admissible against defendant). In these cases, the declarants surely know that their actions
will become known to police and thus available for use in a subsequent trial, but they may
have no immediate awareness that they are providing evidence when they undertake their
actions.
88. Nos. 58201-1-I, 58202-0-I, 2007 WL 2297111, at *1-3 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2007)
(per curiam).
89. Id. at *3.
90. Id. at *2.
91. Id. at *4.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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court further held that since Donovan's statements were not offered for
their truth, there was no Confrontation Clause issue.'
One can debate whether using the statements for Donovan's
knowledge of McKinney and McKinney's nearby location-potentially
important to determine whether McKinney was actually the source of
the drugs or a foil for her boyfriend-was hearsay under the Federal
Rules' definition.7 But Zenni itself is debatable, as are many close
questions at the border created by the assertion-centered view's
distinction between beliefs that are unintentionally revealed and those
that are indirectly, though intentionally, asserted.98 However, the issue
is not whether the McKinney court decided the hearsay question
correctly under the Federal Rules. It is whether it denied the defendant
her confrontation right by erroneously assuming the applicability of the
assertion-based definition to the Confrontation Clause. In this case, the
statements "connecting" McKinney to Donovan and the Sunrise Hotel
were clearly testimonial, having been made to a uniformed officer in
response to his inquiries into drug activity.9' Donovan's credibility was
implicated even when her statements were used only to show that
Donovan knew McKinney and that she was nearby.' °° Like all
testimonial, declarant-centered hearsay, the statement triggered
McKinney's confrontation right unless there is a special reason why the
Confrontation Clause exempts it.
As with false exculpatory statements, "connecting" statements often
escape confrontation scrutiny because courts confuse nonassertive
conduct with statements that are not offered for their truth. The
primrose path to erroneously admitting testimonial, nonassertive
conduct in this manner is illustrated by United States v. Rodriguez-
Lopez.0 1 The court admitted ten calls requesting heroin received on the
96. Id.
97. Donovan's responses to the officer's questions went beyond the acts of requesting or
buying drugs in the earlier calls and are therefore arguably not covered by Zenni's rationale
that the declarant was performing an act rather than intentionally communicating something.
98. For example, the court in McKinney admitted Donovan's call to McKinney's cell
phone in which she had complained of "'waiting for over 20 minutes for her shit from
[McKinney],"' and another call in which the caller said that McKinney "had [taken her
boyfriend's] 'stuff' and 'was now selling [it].' 2007 WL 2297111, at *2. Admitting these
statements to show McKinney's involvement in selling, but not for their literal truth,
stretches, if not obliterates, the limits of Zenni, or perhaps illustrates why Zenni was wrongly
decided in the first instance.
99. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
100. McKinney, 2007 WL 2297111, at *24.
101. 565 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2009).
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defendant's seized cell phone to "support an inference that Rodriguez
was . . . dealing heroin."' ' It erroneously held that the calls to
Rodriguez were not hearsay because the inference from their being
placed to his involvement "[did] not depend on the callers' truthfulness,
memory, or perception."' 3 It claimed that the calls were probative
merely because they were made, despite the truth of the "declarants'
belief that the defendant could supply the desired heroin."' ° On that
analysis, however, the calls were admissible without confrontation even
if government agents intentionally orchestrated them for the express
purpose of generating evidence for use at trial. One hoped that if such a
case arose, the court would immediately realize that calls of this type are
probative of the defendant's involvement only if offered to show the
truth of the declarants' beliefs that the defendant is involved. Thus, the
government-generated calls are testimonial hearsay requiring
confrontation, if they are admissible at all, and the independently
initiated calls are admissible without confrontation only because they
are non-testimonial, nonassertive conduct, and not because their
probative value is independent of the callers' credibility.
Such hope, however, was dashed in United States v. Cesareo-Ayala.'5
The court held that monitored calls made to the defendant by Mendez, a
recently arrested coconspirator, were not testimonial hearsay although
requested and supervised by government agents. Among other things,
Mendez told Cesareo-Ayala that Mendez had his money from an earlier
sale and needed to get more drugs from him to sell.' The court held
that the calls were not hearsay requiring confrontation because
Mendez's testimonial capacities were not implicated when the calls were
considered as proof of their business relationship rather than for any
implicit assertion made for the "benefit of the officers."'" That analysis
would undoubtedly be true if Mendez's statements were adopted by
Cesareo-Ayala during the call, and hence admissible pursuant to
Federal Rule 801(d)(2)(B) as Cesareo-Ayala's adopted admissions. But
the court essentially disavowed this rubric when it analogized the calls to
those in Rodriguez-Lopez where the defendant never participated." s
Apparently, the Cesareo-Ayala jury had never been instructed to
102. Id. at 315.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 576 F.3d 1120 (10th Cir. 2009).
106. Id. at 1129-30.
107. Id. at 1129.
108. Officers intercepted the calls. Id.
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consider Mendez's statements only insofar as Cesareo-Ayala's responses
"manifested an adoption or belief in [their] truth."' ' Thus, to avoid the
confrontation requirement, the court held that Mendez's statements,
like those in Rodriguez-Lopez, could stand alone because they were
somehow probative apart from their truth.' °
Nonetheless, the analysis is similarly flawed. Apart from anything
that Cesareo-Ayala said in response, the probative value of Mendez's
attempts to pay Cesareo-Ayala for drugs already received from him, and
to obtain more drugs from him to sell, depended entirely on the truth of
Mendez's belief that Cesareo-Ayala was Mendez's supplier. Moreover,
those statements, made at the urging of police to obtain evidence against
Cesareo-Ayala, were clearly testimonial. Even assuming that they were
properly admitted as non-hearsay, nonassertive conduct, their
admission-like admission of the statements in McKinney-violated the
defendant's confrontation right unless there is historical evidence
showing that only assertion-based hearsay triggered the right to
confront an absent declarant at the time of the Founding.
III. CONFRONTATION OF NONASSERTIVE CONDUCT AT
THE FOUNDING
Rather than defining the scope of the confrontation right by
reference to the reliability concerns informing hearsay policy, Crawford
defines the scope of the requirement by reference to common law rules
governing admissibility of testimonial hearsay at the time of the
Constitution's adoption."' History requires using the declarant-
centered hearsay definition, however inconvenient. Before twentieth-
century critiques resulted in the Federal Rules' revision of the hearsay
definition to encompass only intended assertions, the common law
employed the declarant-centered definition. Wright v. Tatham, decided
in 1837 and affirmed in 1838,112 pronounced the authoritative view of the
common law on the subject. There, the Court of the Exchequer
Chamber held that a declarant's beliefs about facts unintentionally
revealed by the declarant's nonassertive conduct or by conduct not
intended to assert those beliefs amounted to "implied statements," and
109. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B).
110. Concurring, Judge Kelly noted that the court's faulty non-hearsay analysis invited
collision with Crawford; he would have acknowledged constitutional error, but found it
harmless. United States v. Cesareo-Ayala, 576 F.3d 1120, 1131-32 (Kelly, J., concurring).
111. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43-56 (2004).
112. (1837) 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (Exch. Div.), affd, (1838) 7 Eng. Rep. 559 (H.L.).
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thus, constituted hearsay."3 Although the Federal Rules rejected Wright
in 1975 when Federal Rule 801 narrowly defined "statements" to
include only intended assertions, the declarant-centered view of Wright
existed at the Founding. Under Crawford, therefore, the declarant-
centered definition of hearsay must determine whether the Constitution
requires confrontation.
Moreover, courts must require confrontation for nonassertive
conduct because the Supreme Court has held that declarants' statements
that the prosecution has not offered for their truth are exempt from
confrontation only because the declarants' credibility is irrelevant to the
statements' probativity. When the prosecution uses such conduct to
infer the declarant's beliefs in certain facts, which beliefs are then used
to prove the existence of those facts, the declarant's credibility is clearly
relevant to the statements' probative value. Simply wrong are courts
that have equated statements offered for the truth of beliefs that
declarants did not intend to assert with statements that are not hearsay
by any definition because the prosecution has not offered them for the
truth of any beliefs held by the declarants, as even the proponents of the
assertion-centered definition embodied in Federal Rule 801 conceded.
The history contains no evidence that nonassertive conduct was
considered exempt from hearsay or from the common law's requirement
of confrontation. Letters similar to those at issue in Wright had been
admitted in the Ecclesiastical and Prerogative Courts-which handled
civil cases without a jury-but the Court of King's Bench, Court of
Exchequer Chamber, and House of Lords in Wright made clear that
these cases established no precedent for the common law courts in
which such evidence had never been received. Similarly, there was
nothing in the definition of hearsay that today includes the phrase "truth
of the matter asserted" that made the assertion-centered approach an
implicit part of Founding-era lawyers' conception of
hearsay/confrontation and from which the common law subsequently
departed. Similarly, there is no evidence that Founding-era lawyers
113. 112 Eng. Rep. at 517. English courts continued to endorse that view, upholding
Wright against challenge in 1992. See R v. Kearley, [1992] 2 AC 228 (H.L.) (appeal taken
from Eng.) (U.K.). In 2003, Parliament enacted comprehensive hearsay reform whose effect,
according to the court in Regina v. Sukadeve Singh, [2006] EWCA Crim. 660, [2006] 2 Crim.
App. 12, was to reverse Kearley and, perhaps, entirely overrule Wright. Section 115 of the
Criminal Justice Act of 2003 states that hearsay statements include matters stated only if "the
purpose, or one of the purposes, of the person making the statement appears to the court to
have been-(a) to cause another person to believe the matter, or (b) to cause another person
to act or a machine to operate on the basis that the matter is as stated." Criminal Justice Act,
2003, c. 44, § 115 (Eng.).
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entertained a definition of "statement" that excluded nonassertive
conduct that the Wright court overturned by including nonassertive
conduct within the ambit of implied statements governed by the hearsay
rule and confrontation requirements.
The Wright case serves as a useful guide for ascertaining how
hearsay would have been understood at the time of the Founding.
Although decided fifty years after the Constitution's framing, Wright
was nothing if not thoroughly litigated, and the key issue to the
precedent-bound judges was whether precedent excluded nonassertive
conduct."' Yet Sir Frederick Pollock, the letters' proponent, conceded
the nonexistence of common law precedent for the proposition that
letters sent to Marsden (the testator)-which showed the writers' belief
that he was capable of understanding matters contained in the letters,
and which, in turn, would show him possessed of the capacity to write a
will-were admissible."5  Noting precedent in the Ecclesiastical and
Prerogative Courts for receiving such letters on the issue of a testator's
competency-where "[ilt is usual.., to plead that the person whose
sanity is in question was treated of a man of sound mind"-Pollock
argued that "the same rule (which is grounded in good sense) should...
prevail in both courts.""' 6 Nonetheless, the judges unanimously rejected
Pollock's argument."7 Although some judges would have admitted the
letters, they would have done so only because they found sufficient
reason to believe that the testator had acted competently in response to
those letters, whose probative value would then lie in giving context to
the actions that suggested his sanity."' Thus, even those judges who
114. The story of the entire litigation is well told in John M. Maguire, The Hearsay
System: Around and Through the Thicket, 14 VAND. L. REV. 741, 749-60 (1961).
115. Wright, 112 Eng. Rep. at 498 ("No instances have been found of decisions as to this
kind of evidence in the Courts of the Common Law."); see also id. at 511 (Bosanquet, J.)
("No precedent has been referred to in which such evidence has been admitted upon a trial at
law.").
116. Id. at 498.
117. "[N]one of the judges who participated in the final hearing of the case flatly
committed himself to the proposition that the three letters should have been admitted as
falling outside the hearsay area." Maguire, supra note 114, at 755-56 (citing Lord Chancellor
Cottenham in Wright v. Tatham, (1838) 7 Eng. Rep. 559, 597 (H.L.)).
118. Wright, 112 Eng. Rep. at 508 (Gurney, B.); id. at 518-19 (Parke, B.) (reporting that
there was no difference among the judges on the principle that the letters were inadmissible
as proof of the declarants' belief in Marsden's sanity, but that some judges found sufficient
basis to believe that Marsden had acted "with reference to the letters," making them
admissible to explain such acts, and candidly conceded that if admitted for that purpose "no
rule of law could prevent their full effect from being produced on the minds of the jury"); see
also Maguire, supra note 114, at 754-55.
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would have admitted the letters did not believe they were competent
evidence in common law courts of the writers' beliefs about the
testator's sanity, from which one could infer that he was sane."'
The reasons for excluding the letters were exactly those one would
expect. The statements were not made under oath and were not subject
to cross-examination. 2 ° Moreover, the letters' potential reliability was
insufficient grounds from which to fashion a new exception, at least for
judges who were not inclined to do so. Arguing for Tatham and against
admission of the letters, Sir Cresswell stated the law as follows:
It is urged on the other side that such evidence ought to
be received, because it would, in the ordinary course of
life, have some effect on the mind; but that is a reason for
excluding it, if not legitimately entitled to attention
according to general rules. In a particular case the
assertion, without oath, of a respectable man might
influence a reasonable mind; but the rule, established for
the safe administration of justice in general, is, that
119. At least one Prerogative Court judge found that the decision of the Court of King's
Bench excluding the letters in Wright was no precedent for excluding them in Ecclesiastical
and Prerogative Courts. 112 Eng. Rep. at 498 (noting two unreported decisions by Sir
Herbert Jenner, Commissary of the Prerogative Court of Canterbury, in which Wright was
cited "without success").
120. Id. at 500 (Sir Cresswell, arguing for Tatham against admission) ("All the letters
were inadmissible, because they presented statements which could not be verified by oath,
and subjected to the test of cross-examination."); id. at 515 (Parke, B.) ("[T]hey are mere
hearsay evidence, statements of the writers, not on oath, of the truth of the matter in
question.").
The administering of an oath furnishes some guarantee for the sincerity of
the opinion; and the power of cross-examination gives an opportunity of
testing the foundation and the value of it. Such being the general rule, it
is necessary for the party who brings forward evidence not on oath to
show some recognised exception to the general rule, within which it falls.
Id. at 506 (Coltman, J.).
If the writers of these letters were produced as witnesses and examined
upon oath, their opinion would be receivable in evidence, because the
grounds of their knowledge and the credibility of their testimony might be
ascertained by cross-examination; but I know of no rule by which the
opinion, however clearly expressed, of a person, however well informed, is
receivable in evidence, unless it be given in the course of legal
examination.
Id. at 511 (Bosanquet, J.).
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evidence unconfirmed by oath, and not subject to cross-
examination, shall not be received.12'
Responding specifically to the claim that "the expressions in [the
letters] are not to be presumed ironical or insincere" 22 -an argument
not unlike the reduced sincerity danger made by the advisory committee
for excluding such proof from hearsay-Sir Cresswell responded, "if the
evidence were given in the ordinary manner by witnesses, that point
might be tried by cross-examination.""
The court also responded to the claim that nonassertive conduct was
more reliable because declarants act upon their beliefs rather than
merely assert them. Baron Parke rejected the distinction between
merely asserting and acting upon beliefs as a reason for excluding
nonassertive conduct. He reasoned that even assertive conduct, such as
sending a letter claiming that the testator was competent, "affords an
inference that such an act would not have been done unless the
statement was true, or believed to be true. ', 124 As a result, accepting the
argument would lead to the "indiscriminate admission of hearsay
evidence of all manner of facts., 125 However wrongly one may think
that the judges responded to Sir Pollock's policy arguments, there was
simply no doubt that they agreed that the issue was one of altering the
hearsay rules with which they were familiar:
[I]t is clear that an acting to a much greater extent and
degree upon such statements . . . would not make the
statements admissible .... [I]f a wager to a large amount
had been made as to the matter..., the payment of that
wager, however large the sum, would not be admissible
to prove the truth of the matter.... You would not have
had any right to present it to the jury as raising an
inference of the truth of the fact, on the ground that
otherwise the bet would not have been paid. It is...
nothing but the mere statement of that fact, with strong
evidence of the belief of it by the party making it.126
121. Id. at 500.
122. Id. Sir Pollock argued, "The test of sincerity.., is that respectable parties openly
do that which would disgrace them if they acted against their belief." Id. at 506.
123. Id. at 500.
124. Id. at 516 (Parke, B.).
125. Id.
126. Id.
[93:14151444
DEFINING HEARSAY
One may fault the opinion for begging the question (maybe paying a
bet should be excluded too?), but one cannot deny that Baron Parke
conceived the existing general rule to exclude the proof. Without
authority for doing so, the court was hardly going to create an
exception127 or suggest that nonassertive conduct was implicitly excluded
from the conception of hearsay evidence all along, considering that it
believed itself asked to "establish an entirely new precedent in a Court
of Common Law."'"
Similarly, all agreed that the cases in the Ecclesiastical and
Prerogative Courts, where judges sat as fact-finders and often employed
different evidence rules, were not precedent for common law courts
sitting with a jury. The rules of evidence in the Ecclesiastical Courts
were different because the judges were fact-finders "and [could]
exercise a discretion, in admitting or rejecting evidence, which would be
dangerous where the fact is tried by a jury."' 29 In cases where similar
letters had been admitted in those courts, they "would have been clearly
inadmissible in a Court of Common Law."'3 ° At the end of day, the only
cases that could support a precedent were those of the common law
courts, and the fact that none were cited in the tortuous history of the
case was not lost on the House of Lords when it affirmed the letters'
exclusion:
[I]t is a circumstance of no small weight in determining
my opinion..., that, with all the industry and ability of
the learned Counsel for the defendants below, no single
instance has been adduced of evidence of this kind
having been admitted in a Court of Common Law.
When I reflect upon the frequent occurrence of questions
of this kind, and I must add, the probable existence of
such proof in favour of competency, I cannot account for
its absence, except upon the supposition that it has been
assumed and considered to be inadmissible for the
127. See id. at 506. Judge Coltman speaks of the general rule requiring proof by the
examination of witnesses upon oath subject to cross examination, which places a duty on a
party seeking to do otherwise to "shew some recognised exception to the general rule." Id.
128. Id. at 514 (Bosanquet, J.).
129. Id. at 501 (Sir Cresswell, arguing for Tatham); id. at 512 (Bosanquet, J.); id. at 521
(Tindall, J.).
130. Id. at 502 (Sir Cresswell, arguing for Tatham); id. at 512 (Bosanquet, J.); id. at 521
(Tindall, J.).
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purpose for which the evidence was upon the present
occasion tendered. 131
The Wright judges took pains to avoid making new law or disguising
new law as part of the old. That attitude makes the case an especially
good indicator of the state of the preexisting law, however poor an
exemplar it is of dynamic common law evolution. The preexisting law,
against which the Founders would have framed the Confrontation
Clause, included nonassertive conduct within its conception of hearsay
evidence. Such evidence was inadmissible without specific exception, of
which none applied, leaving counsel to urge (unsuccessfully) a
previously unrecognized reduction in the hearsay rule's scope.
132
Consequently, suggestions that the Wright case made a mess of an
earlier hearsay conception consistent with the assertion-based view are
either anachronisms or perhaps wishful thinking among those who
prefer the assertion-based view. For example, the court in Stoddard v.
State133 suggested an "earlier, and essentially indistinguishable, common
law counterpart[]" to the Federal Rules' assertion-centered definition of
hearsay that created a "well-marked boundary between ... clean-cut
paradigms of hearsay and non-hearsay," but which lasted only until the
Wright court disrupted the heretofore "ship shape" hearsay rule with its
"caveat" of implied assertions.'T m But the court failed to offer even the
slightest historical evidence for the existence of such halcyon days
before Wright. Instead, it relied on Professor Mueller's observation that
to use the term "implied assertion" to refer to what a declarant's
conduct suggests, rather than what it is intended to convey, "divorces
'assertion' from normal usage, making it mean essentially 'evidence' and
severing it from expressive or communicative purpose."1 "'
131. Wright v. Tatham, (1838) 7 Eng. Rep. 559, 570 (H.L.) (Williams, J.).
132. Maguire, supra note 114, at 752-53.
As a general exclusive principle, the hearsay rule was solidly established.
The foundations of the main exceptions admitting some assertive hearsay
had also been laid. Those exceptions certainly did not include anything
covering the needs of the litigant offering the letters in the immediate
situation, nor does there appear in the long and varied discussion much
special urging to fabricate a new hearsay exception. Argument of counsel
and judges can on the whole be most easily referred to as effort for and
against restricting definition of the exclusionary rule's scope.
Id. (discussing the Wright case).
133. 850 A.2d 406 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004), rev'd, 887 A.2d 564 (Md. 2005).
134. Id. at 412.
135. Mueller, supra note 32, at 419 n.153.
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Although true, Professor Mueller's observation hardly provides
support for the proposition that the hearsay definition existing at the
Founding used the term "assertion" in the way in which we may use it
today, nor is there any evidence that he intended his observation as a
historical argument. Professor Mueller was simply making a point about
what he-like other assertion-centered proponents-sees as the
overbreadth of Wright's conception of hearsay and the unfortunate
locution declarant-centered proponents use when trying to show their
position consistent with the language of Federal Rule 801(c)."3 Baron
Parke's Wright opinion refers to implied statements, not implied
assertions, making no pretense that its holding was consistent with an
assertion-centered view.137
Moreover, recent studies of evidence law existing at the Founding
agree that the prevailing definitions of hearsay did not even include the
phrase "truth of the matter," much less the phrase "truth of the matter
asserted."'38 They referred more generally to all unsworn, out-of-court
statements. 3 9 To this definition, the contemporary, commonly used
evidence sources added the lack of cross-examination as a rationale."4
It is that rationale which the Supreme Court holds limits the
Confrontation Clause to out-of-court statements by persons whose
cross-examination is useful because their credibility is implicated, i.e.,
when their statements are offered for the truth of the matter asserted.14'
136. Id.
137. Wright v. Tatham, (1837) 112 Eng. Rep. 488, 516-17 (Exch. Div.) (Parke, B.).
[P]roof of a particular fact . . . which is relevant only as implying a
statement or opinion of a third person ... [is] inadmissible in all cases
where such a statement or opinion not on oath would be of itself
inadmissible; and, therefore .... the letters which are offered only to
prove the competence of the testator, that is the truth of the implied
statements therein contained, were properly rejected.
Id.
138. Stephen Aslett, Comment, Crawford's Curious Dictum: Why Testimonial 'Non-
Hearsay' Implicates the Confrontation Clause, 82 TUL. L. REV. 297, 311-22 (2008); Thomas Y.
Davies, Not "The Framers' Design": How the Framing-Era Ban Against Hearsay Evidence
Refutes the Crawford-Davis "Testimonial" Formulation of the Scope of the Original
Confrontation Clause, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 349, 351 n.9, 462 n.279 (2007).
139. Davies, supra note 138; Aslett, supra note 138, at 312 (citing Thomas Y. Davies,
Revisiting the Fictional Originalism in Crawford's "Cross-Examination Rule": A Reply to Mr.
Kry, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 557, 561-62 n.15 (2007); Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers
Know, and When Did They Know It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71
BROOK. L. REV. 105, 196 (2005)).
140. Aslett, supra note 138, at 313 n.83.
141. Id. at 311-22.
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If hearsay's contemporaneous formal Founding definition did not even
limit hearsay statements to those offered for the "truth of the matter,"
then it surely does not follow that it further limited hearsay only to the
truth of matters that a declarant had intentionally asserted. Finally,
there was nothing about the term "statement" in that hearsay definition
that showed a choice to avoid using it as the Wright court did, namely to
include actions that effectively "make a statement" about an actor's
beliefs, even if the actor did not intend to communicate them.
In fact, one commentator has gone so far as to suggest that a
historically accurate definition of hearsay requires post-Crawford courts
to demand confrontation of all testimonial statements made out of
court, even if they are not hearsay under any modern definition because
they are not offered for their truth.1"2 That approach would include
nonassertive hearsay whose inclusion this Article urges. But it would
also go further and encompass statements that do not implicate a
declarant's credibility, such as a murder victim's report to police that the
defendant was dealing drugs, when offered only to show that the
defendant knew that the victim was accusing him, and thus had motive
for murder, rather than to show that the defendant had been dealing
drugs.14'3 Nothing in this Article's analysis supports that result, which
142. Id.
143. Id. at 303. Aslett argues that the defendant in such a case is prejudiced because he
must disprove the allegation (and hence the strength of the motive) by evidence besides the
victim's cross-examination, and that "the jury could still be convinced that the false
accusation itself was enough" to provide a motive to kill "if the false accusation caused
negative consequences." Id. at 302-03. The argument proves too much. It is precisely
because even a false accusation can give motive for murder that hearsay theory calls the
victim's credibility not probative when the allegation is offered merely for the fact that it was
known to the defendant, and not to show the defendant's involvement in drug dealing. There
is no drug dealing established by the statement to disprove by cross-examination or
otherwise. If the prosecution does introduce the evidence to show the defendant's drug
dealing, and hence a more specific and powerful reason to fear the accusation and to kill to
eliminate it, then confrontation is required because the evidence is being offered for the truth.
If the prosecution does not offer the evidence for the truth, then it is limited to arguing
whatever motive can be inferred from the victim's accusation, whether a ridiculous lie or the
gospel truth, and the defendant is limited to showing that the allegation-true or false-was
unknown to him or unlikely to cause him harm. Aslett betrays his allegiance to the "truth of
the matter asserted" conception by choosing an example of testimonial non-hearsay that he
can claim implicates the declarants' credibility only because juries will use it wrongly. His
other example is that of testimonial statements on whose truth experts rely when rendering
their opinions, but which juries are told to use only for the non-hearsay purpose of evaluating
the basis for the expert's opinion, and not directly for the truth of their contents. One need
not reject the "truth of the matter" formulation to find that the testimony of an expert whose
opinion presupposes the truth of the testimonial statements is enough to trigger the
confrontation right. See, e.g., People v. Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d 727, 732-33 (N.Y. 2005)
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demands confrontation even when the missed opportunity to cross-
examine has no bearing on the statement's probative value because its
relevance depends only upon whether it was spoken. ' 4 Surely more
than a general definition that historically did not expressly state the
"truth of the matter" limitation, but which did incorporate the absence
of cross-examination rationale, is required before reaching that result.
None of the articles showing the absence of the "truth of matter
asserted" language in the hearsay definition cite cases in which courts
included out-of-court statements not offered for their truth within the
ambit of hearsay, and consequently excluded the statements or
demanded the declarants' confrontation. In contrast, Wright's holding is
an express statement of the common law's inclusion of nonassertive
conduct within the ambit of hearsay and constitutes a landmark
precedent for consequently excluding it at trial. Thus, all the historical
indications support extending the confrontation right at least far enough
to encompass the testimonial, nonassertive conduct whose exclusion we
can be certain the common law courts required.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR INCORPORATING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
DEFINITION OF HEARSAY
Constitutionally mandating the declarant-centered definition of
hearsay for confrontation purposes need not be disruptive. Rather than
provide two different definitions of hearsay, one for testimonial hearsay
offered against criminal defendants and another for all other situations,
(experts' reliance on testimonial hearsay statements for their truth triggers defendant's
confrontation right because evaluating the expert's opinion requires "accepting as a
premise... that the statements were true," so "[t]he distinction between a statement offered
for its truth and a statement offered to shed light on an expert's opinion is not meaningful in
this context").
144. For example, eliminating the truth of the matter asserted requirement would
demand confrontation even if the victim's accusation were offered merely to prove that he
was able to speak and thus alive when he reported the defendant's drug activities to the
police. Aslett seems to avoid this result by limiting his example to one where he assumes that
a jury would use the evidence for its forbidden hearsay inference, although it is also relevant
for a non-hearsay purpose. The real test of Aslett's thesis is whether the Confrontation
Clause is offended when the lack of confrontation potentially impedes the defendant's ability
to rebut evidence that is correctly used for its non-hearsay purpose. For example, does the
Confrontation Clause prohibit using the unsworn, uncross-examined accusation to prove that
the accuser was alive before the defendant allegedly killed him because he is not available to
the defense to contradict the proof? Does it prohibit using the victim's accusations against
the defendant, regardless of their truth, to show the defendant's motive to kill because the
victim is not available to the defendant to deny that he ever made the threats? Although it is
undoubtedly true that the definition of hearsay was less than fully developed at the Founding,
it seems unlikely that the oath and cross-examination rationales were so far divorced from the
concern for witness credibility.
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courts and legislatures in all jurisdictions can simply revert to the
original common law definition encompassing nonassertive conduct.
Each jurisdiction can then choose whether to enact a hearsay exception
for nonassertive conduct, which would not allow admission of
testimonial, nonassertive conduct without confrontation. This proposal
would simply require courts to do with nonassertive conduct what they
are already doing with all other hearsay-that is, base the confrontation
right on whether the hearsay is testimonial, without regard for whether
an applicable hearsay exception applies. Recasting nonassertive
conduct as a hearsay exception would prevent courts from confusing its
exclusion by post-Founding hearsay definitions with its constitutionally
required inclusion under the Confrontation Clause. A uniform
definition of hearsay would remind courts to protect defendants' right to
confront testimonial, nonassertive conduct and the testimonial, intended
assertions defined as hearsay by the Federal Rules.
In contrast, accomplishing that goal will be elusive in a regime in
which the declarant-centered definition of hearsay applies to testimonial
statements offered against criminal defendants, while the assertion-
centered definition, which excludes nonassertive conduct, applies in all
other circumstances. First, the belief that the hearsay definition reflects
a single, correct conceptual structure rather than a historically
contingent one reflecting different policy choices equivalent to those
informing hearsay exceptions will undoubtedly persist. As shown by the
cases in Part II, there is a persistent, though incorrect, association
between non-hearsay under Federal Rule 801(c) and statements that are
not offered for the truth of any matter and thus do not implicate the
declarant's credibility.'45 That association has outlasted the Federal
Rules by more than thirty years and will continue to encourage courts to
think that the assertion-centered definition with which they are familiar
applies across the board.'
More critically, nonassertive conduct can easily be overlooked as
hearsay, a fact that plays no small role in some commentators'
arguments for excluding it from the statutory definition. 147 But where
there is no option to exclude it because the Confrontation Clause
demands the declarant-centered definition, realizing the constitutional
goal requires a doctrine that will help lawyers and judges recognize
145. See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
146. One might say that the incorrect assumption of a single definition sparked the need
for this Article.
147. Park, supra note 14, at 791.
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nonassertive hearsay. Doing so requires practice, and the easiest way to
encourage courts and lawyers to practice is by changing the statutory
definition of hearsay to track the constitutional definition. Jurisdictions
that currently exclude nonassertive conduct from hearsay can then
create a hearsay exception for nonassertive conduct, while those that
retained the traditional declarant-centered view need not.1'48 Instead of
employing the constitutional definition in only the relatively few cases
where prosecutors offer testimonial, nonassertive conduct, courts and
lawyers will use it all the time, while also becoming familiar with a
hearsay exception that, in most jurisdictions, will allow the proof except
when the Confrontation Clause applies.
The proposal uses the bias in favor of a single definition to capture
all the hearsay whose identification the Constitution demands. It
requires lawyers and courts routinely to exercise the "muscles"
necessary to identify all hearsay requiring confrontation. It also
requires them to learn the exception for nonassertive conduct, pursuant
to which such conduct will be admissible in cases where the
Confrontation Clause does not apply. Encountering a case when the
prosecution offers potentially testimonial, nonassertive conduct, courts
and defense lawyers will recognize it as hearsay and realize-as they do
now for assertion-centered hearsay-that the statement's testimonial
quality, not its qualification under a hearsay exception, determines
admissibility without confrontation. Courts and lawyers will be far less
likely to spot testimonial, nonassertive hearsay under a regime that
defines it as hearsay pursuant to a rarely used rule that applies only
when the prosecution offers such evidence against criminal defendants.
Moreover, there is an important collateral benefit to changing the
hearsay definition even in those cases where confrontation is not an
issue. In most jurisdictions, nonassertive conduct will be admissible
pursuant to a hearsay exception rather than excluded by the basic
hearsay definition. Admitting nonassertive conduct under a hearsay
exception recognizes that the person engaging in that conduct is a
hearsay declarant whose credibility can be attacked and supported as if
he were a witness.
149
Admission of persons' nonassertive conduct makes their credibility
relevant, like that of any hearsay declarant under the assertion-centered
definition, so there can be no argument against this result. That the
148. Compare FED. R. EvID. 801(c), which would require an exception, with TEX. R.
EvID. 801(c), which would not.
149. FED. R. EvID. 806.
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Federal Rules allow impeachment of statements admitted under hearsay
exceptions justified by reduced hearsay dangers, but deny impeachment
of nonassertive conduct admitted pursuant to a narrowed hearsay
definition that is also justified by reduced hearsay dangers, has always
been an anomaly leading to arbitrary and indefensible results. " ° For
example, in United States v. Garcia-Villanueva, the court held that a
criminal defendant, whose out-of-court statements telling her alleged
accomplices not to smuggle aliens had been admitted to show her
noninvolvement, should have been declared immune from
impeachment."' The court reasoned that the defendant could not be
impeached because her statements were "verbal conduct" providing
circumstantial evidence of state of mind, which is not hearsay under
Federal Rule 801, rather than hearsay statements asserting her state of
mind, which is hearsay under Federal Rule 801, but admissible pursuant
to Federal Rule 803(3)'s state of mind exception. Either way, however,
her credibility was implicated; the probative value of the proof as
evidence of her desire that she not be involved depended entirely upon
whether she meant for her accomplices to refrain from smuggling
(sincerity) and the accuracy with which her words reported her attitude
about her own, rather than the others', involvement (narration or
ambiguity).
The proposal avoids the possibility that courts would disallow
impeachment of nonassertive conduct altogether because it does not
qualify as hearsay. That result unjustifiably exempts nonassertive
conduct from impeachment, although its probative value depends on the
declarant's credibility. Worse, such a result would compound the injury
to defendants who are denied the opportunity to impeach the persons
whose nonassertive conduct they also are not able to confront. (Thus,
for example, none of the defendants in the cases discussed in Part II
would have been allowed to impeach the absent declarants as if they
were witnesses.) Consequently, the defendants cannot introduce the
declarants' inconsistent statements unless another hearsay exception
applies. "2 Nor can they show that the declarants were convicted of
perjury, are biased against the defendant, or suffer from memory loss.53
150. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957, 972-73
(1974). Professor Tribe argues that reduced, but not eliminated, hearsay dangers associated
with nonassertive conduct justifies, at most, creating a hearsay exception that admits
nonassertive conduct while allowing its impeachment pursuant to Federal Rule 806.
151. 855 F.2d 863, No. 87-5261, 1988 WL 86215, at *1-3 (9th Cir. 1988).
152. FED. R. EVID. 613.
153. See FED. R. EVID. 609; see also United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 50 (1984).
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Such a result is indefensible and, with respect to the bias evidence, may
even be unconstitutional." Changing the statutory definition to include
nonassertive conduct while creating a hearsay exception for such
conduct will assure that courts will allow impeachment of those
declarants. This result benefits fact-finding in all cases and avoids the
"double whammy" under current law when defendants can neither
confront nor impeach testimonial, nonassertive conduct.
V. PROTECTING THE CONFRONTATION RIGHT FROM EVISCERATION
BY EVIDENCE JUSTIFYING INVESTIGATORS' BEHAVIOR
Extending the confrontation right to testimonial, nonassertive
conduct will have little or no effect unless courts protect it from routine
evasion by prosecutors claiming to introduce testimonial hearsay only
for its effect on the listener and not for the truth of the matter asserted
to explain investigators' actions that defendants have not questioned.
By arguing that investigators took the steps they did because they
observed or otherwise learned of the testimonial hearsay, prosecutors
have been able to introduce such evidence with alarming frequency,
leaving a misleading limiting instruction the defendant's only possible
protection.'55 Without a clear constitutional mandate to avoid this
154. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) (the Sixth Amendment right to confront
witnesses includes the right to show a witness's bias against a defendant).
155. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 560 F.3d 754, 764-65 (8th Cir. 2009) (evidence
that the victim said he knew the person who shot him and his accomplice as "Clean" and
"Charmar" was admitted to show why the officer searched a database for those names and
found an incident report linking the defendants and providing their full names); United States
v. Pugh, 273 F. App'x 449, 455 (6th Cir. 2008) (testimony that the officer was given the
defendant's name as a suspect was admissible to show why he investigated him); Decay v.
State, No. CR 08-1259, 2009 WL 3785695 (Ark. Nov. 12, 2009) (court admitted the detective's
testimony that "an individual that told us that Mr. Decay told him that he committed the
murders" to explain "why Decay was not arrested on April 4, 2007, but was arrested on April
6, 2007") (internal quotation marks omitted); People v. Varnado, Nos. B188489, B194298,
B195683, 2007 WL 3025083 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2007) (inculpatory eyewitness
identifications were admissible to explain why the officer included the defendants' pictures in
a photo array); State v. Barney, 185 P.3d 277, 279 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007) (evidence of an
anonymous call to police describing a person going to doors and peeking in windows in a
certain neighborhood was admitted "to explain the officers' actions after receiving the
dispatch" and "how the officer initially approached Barney as a suspect"); Commonwealth v.
Pelletier, 879 N.E.2d 125, 130 (Mass. Ct. App. 2008) (the victims' statements to police were
offered to provide context for the police investigation); People v. Hall, 861 N.Y.S.2d 889, 890-
91 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (testimony that a police officer told the defendant that his mother
had not corroborated his alibi was admitted "to explain why the defendant confessed to the
police when he did," although the court did not say why the timing of the defendant's
confession was relevant and declined to decide whether the prosecutor used the testimony
improperly because the contention was "not preserved for our review") (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted); State v. James, 158 P.3d 102, 109-10 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007)
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result, courts are rendering the Confrontation Clause's protection
against unconfronted, testimonial hearsay illusory. Although this
problem encompasses all testimonial hearsay, it is particularly acute for
nonassertive conduct. An instruction that tells the jury not to use
nonassertive conduct for the truth of the matter asserted is particularly
misleading, if not incoherent, because nonassertive conduct is not
offered to prove anything that the declarant explicitly or implicitly
intends to assert. Thus, clarifying the hearsay inferences arising from
nonassertive conduct creates a propitious opportunity also to consider
the very limited circumstances under which true non-hearsay use of
testimonial statements avoids implicating the Confrontation Clause.
As an example, consider the following scenario. " 6 The courts in all
of the cases discussed in Part II see the light and hold that testimonial,
nonassertive conduct triggers the confrontation right. Without
producing the declarants, the prosecution nonetheless calls the officers
who heard the declarants' inculpatory statements to testify about those
statements, which admittedly require confrontation if offered for their
truth. But when the defendants object, the prosecutors claim that they
are offering the statements only to explain why the officers, having
(evidence of statements by anonymous informants was admitted to "recount[] the course of
the investigation to explain why the investigation was in the . . . neighborhood" and to
"connect to" testifying witnesses' claims that they also heard multiple shots); cf State v.
Simmons, 233 S.W.3d 235, 238 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (police officer's testimony about the
victim's description of the details of her sexual abuse, "including where episodes occurred,
what sex acts transpired and how Daughter and Defendant cleaned up, afterwards," was
admissible to show motivation behind the investigation and to explain the "Daughter's
examination at the emergency room and the seizure and testing of washcloths found in
Defendant's home"; court discussed hearsay but not the confrontation issue because an
accomplice testified at trial); People v. Carney, 795 N.Y.S.2d 10, 11 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005)
(court admitted testimony concerning a 911 call made by a non-testifying declarant "as
background information explaining why the police took a series of investigatory actions");
United States v. Burchard, No. 5:07-Cr-9, 2007 WL 1894257 (W.D. Ky. Jun. 29, 2007)
(prosecution may offer officers' testimony about declarants' allegations that the defendant
used and sold drugs to explain why the defendant was investigated and searched for
committing those crimes); Commonwealth v. Rega, 933 A.2d 997, 1017 (Pa. 2007) (trooper's
testimony that defendant's accomplice gave an alibi that conflicted with the defendant's was
admissible "to explain the justification for further investigating [them]"; court discussed
hearsay but not the confrontation issue because an accomplice testified at trial).
156. The scenario is adapted from Pelletier, 879 N.E.2d at 130, where the court, although
entertaining serious doubts about whether Crawford exempts testimonial, nonassertive
conduct, nonetheless found that such conduct did not require confrontation when offered "to
set ... the context for the police investigation." See also People v. Salido, No. B186643, 2007
WL 2325810, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2007) (accomplice's false alibi for the defendant
that linked the defendant to the accomplice was admissible when offered to explain why
officers contacted defendant).
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heard the inculpatory statements, decided to take (or forego) some
subsequent investigative step, and not for the truth of any matters
asserted by the declarants. 5' The court admits the evidence as
background evidence to show the course of the investigation, although
the defendants have not made an issue of why the officers acted as they
did. The court then instructs the jury to consider inferences from the
fact that the declarants uttered the statements to investigators, but not
to consider inferences that rely on the truth of matters asserted by the
declarants. Unbeknownst to the jury, it is trapped in a dilemma that is
not of its own making: It can ignore the statements entirely, because
there is no issue to which they are relevant for their permissible, non-
hearsay purpose, or it can consider them for their impermissible hearsay
purpose in violation of the defendants' confrontation rights. Misled by
the court's limiting instruction into believing that there is a permissible
use for the evidence, the jury uses it improperly.
The scenario described above is entirely avoidable if courts
recognize that, unless the defense raises one, no issue exists as to why
the police may have acted as they did or why the investigation
developed as it did to which the testimonial hearsay is relevant if used
for its non-hearsay inference. Judge Easterbrook crystallized the
essential problem with the reasoning of courts who consider such
testimony relevant despite the defense by noting that "every time a
person says to the police 'X committed the crime' the statement
(including all corroborating details) would be admissible to show why
the police investigated X."'  Sanctioning that rubric "would eviscerate
157. The usual limiting instruction is inapt when applied to nonassertive conduct since
the declarant's beliefs for which it is offered are unintentionally revealed rather than
intentionally asserted. For example, the instruction does not convey that the jury is
prohibited from using a declarant's statement falsely exculpating the defendant as evidence
that the declarant has knowledge of the defendant's guilt. See supra notes 37-42 and
accompanying text. Courts have even erroneously held a limiting instruction unnecessary
when a declarant's false exculpatory statement is offered to show the declarant's knowledge
of the defendant's guilt. United States v. Trala, 86 F.3d 536, 544-45 (3d. Cir. 2004)
(cautioning the jury against considering the truthfulness of the declarant's statements was
unnecessary since they were obviously false and admitted to establish that the declarant was
lying to the police about the source of the money in the defendant's car). Similarly, the
instruction does not convey that the jury is prohibited from using the declarant's act of
looking for the defendant at a place where drugs are sold as proof that the defendant
frequents that location. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text. A coherent
instruction would say that the jury is prohibited from using the declarant's statements as
proof of anything that the declarant believes. The proper instruction makes clear that the
evidence has no permissible purpose whatsoever unless the defendant has questioned the
propriety of the investigation.
158. United States v. Silva, 380 F.3d 1018, 1020 (7th Cir. 2004).
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the constitutional right to confront and cross-examine one's accusers."' 59
Out-of-court statements admitted for their effect on the police to
explain why they acted as they did are relevant only when the defendant
argues that, for example, the officers were "officious intermeddlers
staking out [the defendant] for nefarious purposes. ' ' 6 When such an
argument is not made, however, that type of testimony is not relevant. 161
Meanwhile, other courts have also recognized that "[a]llowing agents to
narrate the course of their investigations, and thus spread before juries
damning information that is not subject to cross-examination, would go
far toward abrogating the defendant's rights under the Sixth
Amendment and the hearsay rule.'
162
Nonetheless, many courts continue to hold that there is no error in
routinely admitting such evidence as long as juries are told not to
consider the evidence for its truth. For example, in Davis v. State, 63 the
Texas Court of Appeals held that permitting a detective to testify to the
substance of anonymous tips inculpating the defendant was not error.
64
The court found that the statements had not been admitted for their
truth, but rather to put the investigation into "context." 165 The court
expressly rejected the defendant's proposal that the court "limit
testimony for this purpose to situations where the defendant challenges
the investigation as being motivated by vendetta or grudge."'
66
Tellingly, the court provided no explanation as to how this context
testimony is otherwise relevant. Instead, it simply denied that there
could be error because statements not offered for their truth are not
hearsay.
Instructions about limited admissibility cannot be expected to
prevent evidence's impermissible use when, contrary to the court's
instruction, the proof has no permissible use at all. Indeed, many courts'
persistent admission of context evidence to explain the course of the
investigation by police, despite the defendant doing nothing to dispute
the conduct of the investigation, makes the point. How can we expect
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1020; see also United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662 (6th Cir. 2004); Sanabria
v. State, 974 A.2d 107, 118-19 (Del. 2009); State v. Johnson, No. 34539-1-11, 2007 WL
1417312, at *4 (Wash. App. Div. May 15, 2007).
163. 169 S.W.3d 673 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005).
164. Id. at 676.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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the jury to disregard the proof entirely when courts themselves fail to
appreciate its irrelevance in that circumstance?
The persistent, though erroneous, assumption of relevancy
seemingly rests on two possibilities. First, one can see the evidence as
relevant because a criminal prosecution reflects a judgment by police or
prosecutors that the defendant is guilty. Consequently, every
investigative step taken or foregone, despite whether it results in
admissible evidence, is relevant to evaluating whether the prosecution's
conclusion is justified. Second, the evidence's relevance can be
defended as a preemptive strike against a misleading inference that
might flow from the prohibition on the prosecution, in the first instance,
from "provid[ing] some explanation for [investigators'] presence and
conduct. ' , 167  Presumably, the feared inference is that mentioned by
Judge Easterbrook-the police were acting without justification-a
conclusion that the jury may draw if prosecutors cannot prove why the
police behaved as they did.
The first conception is so obviously improper that one will not find
courts explicitly defending it. The law is clear that juries are to find facts
by evaluating for themselves the strength of the evidence that is
admitted at trial and are not to abdicate their responsibility by
evaluating the reasonableness of the conclusion of guilt implicit in the
prosecution's bringing the case to trial.
Whatever the limits of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals
61
may prove to be, only a sea change in Anglo-American evidence law
would permit investigators to give expert testimony containing their
opinion of the defendant's guilt; such an approach would render the
167. See United States v. Levine, 378 F. Supp. 2d 872, 875 (E.D. Ark. 2005).
168. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), its progeny, and the
amended Federal Rule 702 that it spawned, govern the admissibility of expert testimony. In
United States v. Johnson, the court held that when experts provide opinion testimony that
relies on hearsay, the prosecution should be prevented from eliciting the contents of the
statements, even though they may bear on the reasonableness of the expert's conclusion. 587
F.3d 625, 635 (4th Cir. 2009). It noted how important it is "that district courts recognize the
risk that a particular expert might become nothing more than a transmitter of testimonial
hearsay and exercise their discretion in a manner to avoid such abuses." Id. The Johnson
court's attitude toward evidence admissible only to show the basis of an expert's opinion
bears contrast with the courts' attitude toward evidence admissible only to show background
discussed in this Article. In Johnson, the court protected the defendant's confrontation right
from exposure to testimonial hearsay statements despite their relevance as a foundation for
the expert's opinion and the possibility of a limiting instruction. In many cases discussed in
this Article, the courts routinely exposed the defendants' confrontation right to testimonial
hearsay statements, despite their inadmissibility as proof of the crimes charged, by claiming
that a limiting instruction was sufficient.
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entire investigation admissible to allow the jury to evaluate the basis for
the investigators' conclusions. Moreover, we ask jurors in criminal cases
to evaluate the strength of evidence admitted at trial, and not to decide
whether the prosecution acted with sufficient justification.' 69 The latter
question is one for the court to decide under the rules of criminal
procedure. Standard jury instructions telling jurors not to consider law
enforcement techniques are intended to dissuade them from deciding
whether they think that the prosecution, given its conduct, deserves a
conviction, rather than whether the proof, however produced, eliminates
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime.'70 To put the
point more prosaically, our fundamental conception of evidence
relevant at trial still rests on a firm distinction between the first and
second half of an episode of the original Law and Order television
series. Each episode is divided into the story of the police investigation
(which considers whether the officers' suspicions about various suspects'
guilt is justified, and whether their investigation is proper) and the story
169. There are rare exceptions. Watson v. State provides a good example. 8 So. 3d 901
(Miss. Ct. App. 2008). In Watson, the defendant was charged with feloniously fleeing a law
enforcement officer in a motor vehicle pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated § 97-9-72(2)
(2006). One of the elements of that crime requires the pursuing officer to have "reasonable
suspicion to believe the driver in question has committed a crime." MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 97-9-72-(1); see also Watson, 8 So. 3d at 904. Thus, it was necessary that the Watson court
admit an out-of-court statement made to the officer accusing the defendant of shoplifting to
explain his reason for giving pursuit. The court instructed the jury to use the statement to
explain the officer's conduct, but not to use it for the truth of the matter asserted. Watson, 8
So. 3d at 903. The rare exception for when a specific statute makes the basis for investigators'
actions an element of the crime proves the rule that an out-of-court statement providing such
a basis is not otherwise relevant.
170. See FED. R. EvID. 104(a); United States v. Torres-Castro, 374 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1008
(2005); see also Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 387 (1964) (admissibility of evidence is a
question only for the judge, while the credibility or weight of evidence is for the jury; since the
voluntariness of a confession bears on both, unlike the issues of probable cause, consent to
search, and the issuance of Miranda warnings, the voluntariness of a confession can be
litigated before the jury after the judge finds it voluntary); United States v. Arbolaez, 450
F.3d 1283, 1292 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting that a "defendant alleging a Miranda violation is
entitled to a determination outside the presence of the jury"); United States v. Collins, 439
F.2d 610, 614 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("[W]hether a particular set of facts gives rise to a
probable cause basis for the belief that a suspect has performed criminal acts is a question of
law to be determined by the court outside the presence of the jury."); Simmons v. United
States, 206 F.2d 427, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (noting that the "issue of probable cause for
appellant's arrest [is] a matter solely for determination by the court"). Jury instructions range
from a general "law enforcement techniques are not your concern" to instructions that
specific techniques such as searches and wiretaps are lawful if the defendant's rights were not
violated, that there is no alleged violation before the jury, and that the jury's views about the
use of such techniques are not to enter into its deliberations. 4 LEONARD SAND ET AL.,
MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL §§ 4.01, 5.08 (2005) (Instructions 4-4
and 5-23).
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of the trial (which depicts the lawyers' presentation of the admissible
evidence). We ask the jury to judge the evidence, not the investigation.
If the police bungled their way into proof sufficient to show guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt, the jury should convict no less than if a flawless
investigation uncovered the same evidence. Conversely, if the evidence
falls short of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury should acquit
regardless of whether the case was assembled, and implicitly endorsed,
by Sherlock Holmes or Inspector Clousseau.
The second assumption, and one that many courts have explicitly
defended, is that it is necessary to deviate from the investigation/trial
distinction at the outset whenever exclusion of otherwise irrelevant
evidence about the investigation would create a misleading impression
that the police acted without justification. This position hypothesizes
that despite general instructions to focus exclusively on proof of the
elements of the crime, juries will nonetheless concentrate on whether
investigative steps were justified, even if defendants do not raise that
issue. Consequently, anything that rebuts a potential attack on the
investigation's integrity is relevant, regardless of whether the defendant
chooses to launch that attack. But the argument proves far too much.
First, by admitting evidence relevant only to the investigation's
integrity, courts undermine their attempt to focus the jury's attention on
the quality of the proof. When courts admit proof relevant only to the
investigation's appropriateness, they turn the prediction that juries will
consider the justification for investigative steps rather than the quality of
the proof, despite instruction to the contrary, into a self-fulfilling
prophecy. Also, by admitting the evidence before the defendant raises
an issue about the investigation's propriety, courts encourage
defendants concerned about the evidence's accrediting effect to contest
the investigators' conduct, even if they had not otherwise planned to do
so, directing the jury's attention that much further afield. Most
importantly, the courts eliminate any opportunity for the defense to
prevent the jury from hearing evidence, which, if used at all, violates the
defendant's confrontation right.'7' Ironically, courts justify this result by
171. If used directly for the truth of the facts it asserts or indirectly for the truth to show
a firm foundation for the prosecution's belief in the defendant's guilt, the evidence violates
the defendant's confrontation rights. Cf. People v. Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d 727, 732-33 (N.Y.
2005) (experts' reliance on testimonial hearsay statements for their truth triggered the
defendant's confrontation right because evaluating the expert's opinion required "accepting
as a premise . . . that the statements were true," so "[tihe distinction between a statement
offered for its truth and a statement offered to shed light on an expert's opinion is not
meaningful in this context").
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hypothesizing that juries will not properly focus their attention on the
trial despite instructions to do so, while inconsistently considering a "not
for the truth" instruction sufficient to cure the Confrontation Clause
problem of the courts' own making. In effect, courts taking this
approach allow the prosecution to "fight fire with fire" before the
defendant has struck a match. In so doing, the jury is needlessly
exposed to evidence whose use is constitutional error when there is no
issue about the investigators' conduct. There is no justification for this
result.
Perhaps the reason why so many courts routinely allow explanatory
evidence to prevent juries from possibly inferring government
misconduct, even when doing so violates defendants' confrontation
right, is that they have become so accustomed to defense counsel
making the argument. It is remarkable how often the defense does
raise, whether intentionally or not, a question about the propriety of the
government's investigation by pursuing themes such as rush to
judgment, sloppy or overreaching investigation, or round up the usual
suspect(s). Nonetheless, the frequency with which defendants may open
the door to the proof by suggesting government misconduct does not
justify admission of the evidence in anticipation. At most, it illustrates
how often defendants will choose to suggest impropriety when a witness
begins her testimony with, say, a statement that she arrived at the scene
to effect an arrest without her first testifying to the radio call that got
her there, or that she organized a lineup containing the defendant
without her first testifying to the tip that focused suspicion on him. That
defendants may often choose a route that justifies admission of the radio
call or the tip for its effect on the officer and not for the truth, however,
does not justify eliminating the defendant's option to prevent admission
of the evidence in the first place by not questioning the propriety of the
arrest or lineup. Courts should welcome that alternative as a first-best
solution, fully protective of the defendant's confrontation right and most
likely to concentrate the jury's attention on what should be its primary
focus-the evidence stemming from the arrest along with the
identification at the lineup. Indeed, by routinely admitting the evidence
and justifying its admission by a limiting instruction, courts have
virtually invited defendants to exacerbate the jury's misdirection toward
the question of whether the prosecution's conduct, rather than the
proof, merits a conviction.
Allowing prosecutors to enter evidence explaining why the police
conducted the investigation as they did, courts unnecessarily encourage
the jury to abandon its proper role of judging the strength of the
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evidence in favor of evaluating the investigation's merits and the
investigators' beliefs. When the defense makes an issue of investigators
acting without sufficient basis, the confusion of the jury's role is
unavoidable; the prosecution must be allowed to rebut the allegation by
showing the basis upon which the investigators acted. In this situation,
the most we can expect of the court is an instruction trying to refocus
the jury's attention on the evidence rather than on the investigators'
behavior or beliefs.
There is no justification, however, for needlessly confusing those
roles when the defense does not advance such a claim. It is already a
difficult enough task to keep the jury focused on the evidence rather
than on the investigation and the beliefs of the investigators. As
subsequent versions of Law and Order show, the investigation is usually
far more compelling than the trial. Law and Order: Special Victims Unit
and Law and Order: Criminal Intent became long-running hits by
spending much more time on the investigation than on the trial, while
Law and Order: Trial by Jury reversed that emphasis and lasted only
172
one season.
To avoid the constitutional violation that is the inevitable
consequence of needlessly exposing the jury to evidence whose only
relevance entails a hearsay inference violating the defendant's
confrontation right, courts should hold that it is error to admit
testimonial hearsay for its effect on investigators unless the defendant
has made an issue of their conduct.'73 Few decided cases require that the
172. See TV.com, Law & Order: Special Victims Unit on TV.com,
http://www.tv.com/law-and-order-special-victims-unit/show/334/summary.html (last visited
May 19, 2010); TV.com, Law & Order: Criminal Intent on TV.com, http://www.tv.com/law-
and-order-criminal-intent/show/1381/summary.html (last visited May 19, 2010); TV.com, Law
& Order: Trial by Jury on TV.com, http://www.tv.com/law-and-order-trial-by-
jury/show/25938/summary.html (last visited May 19, 2010).
173. United States v. Silva, 380 F.3d 1018, 1020 (7th Cir. 2004), endorsed this view: "If a
jury would not otherwise understand why an investigation targeted a particular defendant, the
testimony could dispel an accusation that the officers were officious intermeddlers staking out
Silva for nefarious purposes. No such argument was made in this case, however, and no other
explanation was given why the testimony would be relevant." Id. (emphasis added).
Unfortunately, however, Silva stopped short of establishing a rule that the evidence's
admission in that circumstance violates the Confrontation Clause, relying instead on an
ad hoc determination that "too much" hearsay was admitted, and that the trial court failed to
give an appropriate limiting instruction or stop the prosecutor from making improper use of
the proof. Id. at 1020-21. While these factors may influence whether the constitutional error
was harmless, they should not affect whether admission of the evidence was error in the first
instance. See also United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 677 (6th Cir. 2004) (inconsistently
saying that evidence is helpful to the jury only on the issue of guilt where there is no dispute
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defendant raise an issue about the investigation before admitting such
evidence. In State v. Munoz, for example, the court permitted the
prosecution to prove that an anonymous caller identified the defendant
as someone to "look at" in connection with a recently attempted
burglary, gave his name, age, and physical description, and while
speaking with an Hispanic accent, identified him as coming from her
country.' Before trial, the defendant moved to exclude the statements
of the anonymous female caller, who was not going to testify at trial, on
the grounds that introducing her statements would violate his
confrontation right.175 The prosecution argued that they were admissible
to show why the police obtained the defendant's fingerprint card from
the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).'76 The
defendant's fingerprint matched one taken from the balcony from which
the burglar unsuccessfully attempted entry.77 The trial court denied the
defendant's motion, finding that since the statements were "being
offered to show the state of mind of the police," rather than for their
truth, they were admissible to show why the police contacted the INS
and investigated the defendant.7 8  On appeal, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court found that admission of the testimony was not error
because it "demonstrate[d] the reasonableness of the police action in
contacting the INS."' 79 Thus, the Munoz court found it proper to admit
the evidence even before the defense had a chance to question the
investigation and despite whether it ever suggested that the police had
acted unreasonably. 8°
Relying on a limiting instruction in that circumstance is unnecessary,
ineffective, and ultimately unconstitutional. When there is no
permissible non-hearsay purpose for the proof, as when there is no
allegation of impropriety to rebut, the improper use of the evidence to
about the investigation's subjects or reasons for their investigation, and that any link between
out-of-court statements and investigators' actions renders the statements relevant).
174. 949 A.2d 155, 157 (N.H. 2008).
175. Id. at 159.
176. Id. at 160.
177. Id. at 157.
178. Id. at 160.
179. Id. at 161.
180. Indeed, the trial court noted that it was routine to "put in any kind of anonymous
tip that's called in," as long as it was "offered to show the state of mind of police" bearing on
the basis for their actions. Munoz, 949 A.2d at 160 (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also State v. Barney, 185 P.3d 277, 280-81 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007) (deeming the offending proof
admissible before trial in a hearing on a motion in limine); United States v. Burchard,
No. 5:06-Cr-9, 2007 WL 1894257 (W.D. Ky. Jun. 29, 2007) (same).
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buttress the prosecution's case is unavoidable. In the prosecutor's
opening statement in Munoz, for example, he "used the tip to
corroborate the description given by [the testifying eyewitness]. 18' How
is the jury, then, to understand the evidence of the anonymous tip? The
appellate court did not consider whether that use of the tip entailed a
hearsay use of the proof since the defense counsel did not specifically
object to the opening statement after losing his motion in limine to keep
out the description." But one can hardly blame defense counsel.
According to the Munoz court's ruling, anything that might bear on
the reasonableness of the officers' actions-a question it specifically
analogized to a court's determination of probable cause -was
admissible. The matching descriptions gave the police reason to credit
the tip and therefore obtain the defendant's fingerprint card. How was
defense counsel supposed to divine that the court would suddenly accept
that the jury would misuse the tip as corroboration supporting the
testifying eyewitness's identification rather than as support for the
investigators' suspicion that the defendant had committed the crime?
And why would the appellate court so anxiously avoid the question of
whether the prosecutor's comment amounted to improper use of the tip
unless it were plainly apparent that it is unreasonable to expect jurors to
distinguish information on which they can rely to decide guilt from
information on which they can rely only to evaluate the investigation,
after exposing them to the latter without reason? After all, if the
prosecutor's comment went too far, did that mean that the jury was not
supposed to note that the descriptions matched, or on its own realize
that it was supposed to use the corroboration only as proof of an issue
that it was not asked to decide (the reasonableness of the investigation),
while ignoring the corroboration's obvious value as proof of an issue it
was asked to decide (the identity of the erstwhile burglar)?
When the consequence of the evidence's use is a constitutional
violation because the proof is testimonial hearsay, the Confrontation
Clause prohibits its admission for its effect on investigators merely
because jurors might consider the propriety of the investigators' actions,
even when explicitly instructed that the investigators' actions are not
their concern. The alternative allows routine evasion of the
Confrontation Clause, while its protections evaporate in a nod and wink
among prosecutors. Unfortunately, even those courts that are sensitive
181. Id. at 161.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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to this possibility have not clearly stated that admission of the proof
before defendants question an investigation's propriety is a
constitutional violation. Instead, they have often sanctioned the lesser
alternative of "sanitizing" the content of the statements, an expedient
which guarantees continued abuse of the "not for the truth" path to
admission of testimonial hearsay. For example, some courts have
allowed investigators to testify only to having "acted 'upon information
received' or words to that effect," reasoning that the need for evidence
explaining actions of the police is slight before the defendant challenges
them, while the potential for misuse is great.1"4 Nonetheless, such an
approach still fails to explain how the evidence is relevant at all, why a
jury focusing on the investigation despite contrary instruction will
discount proof that the police have information besides that admitted at
trial, what amounts to proper sanitation, and whether such sanitation
can be accomplished.
Munoz, again, serves as an example. Once the trial court indicated
that it would allow the anonymous call to explain "why the investigation
took the turn that it did," the defendant suggested allowing the officer
to testify merely that the investigation had led police to suspect the
defendant."5 The trial court rejected the suggestion, stating that it
would unfairly prejudice the defendant by suggesting that the police
were aware of his past criminal activity. It then allowed the prosecution,
as a less prejudicial alternative, to prove the caller's suggestion that the
police "look at" the defendant in connection with the specific burglary
for which he was on trial.'" The trial court was clearly correct to
envision that any reference to extrajudicial information implicating the
defendant in possession of the police, even if unspecified, would
invariably be used for its truth since nobody questioned the propriety of
the investigation. But admitting specific information implicating the
defendant in the crime for which he was on trial hardly improved
matters.
The trial court seemed more concerned with the prospect that the
jury would use the proof as evidence of other crimes than it was with the
prospect that the jury would violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right by using the information either as proof that the defendant had
engaged in other crimes or as proof of the crime for which the defendant
184. United States v. Levine, 378 F. Supp. 2d 872, 875-76 (E.D. Ark. 2005) (citing
2 MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 249, at 103).
185. Munoz, 949 A.2d at 160.
186. Id.
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was on trial. The court was correct to think that even a general
reference to extrajudicial information obtained by the police justifying
the investigation would prejudice the defendant by inviting the jury to
perceive that information as accurately implicating the defendant in
something, if not this particular crime. But the same argument was at
least as powerful for the prejudice resulting from admission of the
specific information; if the jury would ignore a limiting instruction to
find proof of other crimes, why would it not ignore a limiting instruction
to find proof of this one? How could evidence of no relevance possibly
justify a constitutional violation? Remarkably, all we are told is that
courts "put in any kind of anonymous tip that's called in" if "it's being
offered to show the state of mind of the police,"'" and that by premising
his objection only on the Confrontation Clause, defense counsel
somehow waived any claim that the evidence's nonexistent probative
value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect."8
187. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly flawed reasoning has caused
courts to decide whether testimonial hearsay statements offered to explain investigators'
behavior violate the Confrontation Clause by considering how prejudicial they are rather
than whether they have any relevance for a non-hearsay purpose. In State v. Barney, the
court held that a limit to the admissibility of hearsay in this context requires exclusion when
the hearsay "tend[s] to identify the accused and establish his guilt." 185 P.3d 277, 281-82
(Kan. Ct. App. 2007). The court nonetheless allowed a description of Barney's physical
attributes, clothing, and activities of peeping into windows, approaching doors, and ringing
doorbells, finding that "the testimony did not identify a particular individual who had
committed a particular crime." Id. at 282. The analysis confuses the question of whether
admitting this evidence before the defendant questioned the officers' actions violated the
Confrontation Clause with whether the violation was harmless error. The Confrontation
Clause does not only give a defendant the right to confront testimony that a court thinks is
particularly damning any more than it guarantees only the right to confront testimony that a
court thinks is unreliable. Puzzlingly, the Barney court, after noting that it must "first
consider whether the evidence is relevant," never discussed why the officers' reason for
investigating Barney was relevant. Id. at 281.
188. See also United States v. Brown, 560 F.3d 754, 764-65 (8th Cir. 2009). The court
there held that a Confrontation Clause objection to evidence that the victim identified the
defendants as his assailants admitted to explain why an officer searched a database for the
defendants' names was insufficient to preserve a claim on appeal that the purported non-
hearsay reason for admission of this evidence was a subterfuge to get the victim's statement
about the defendants in front of the jury. The court held that issue was waived because
counsel "did not argue at trial that the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighed its non-
hearsay value." Id. The holding presupposes that non-hearsay use of the evidence made a
fact of consequence more likely than it would be without the evidence, i.e., was relevant, a
position that the court assumed, but never articulated. The defendant never alleged
misconduct in the way the police got to the defendants. Since the court would or could not
articulate the evidence's relevance, it is a hard rule that says that defense counsel, on pain of
waiving his Confrontation Clause objection, has to play along and pretend it is relevant to
argue that its probative value is nonetheless outweighed by prejudice.
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The Munoz court avoided addressing how the probative value of the
proof justified its prejudice, but others have attempted to address the
problem by striking a proper balance. Those courts have had no success
in formulating coherent protection for the defendant's confrontation
rights because they erroneously concede that explanatory evidence is
relevant in the absence of an express or implied challenge to the
propriety of the investigators' conduct. They typically begin by
exploring the possibility of excising the content of the hearsay statement
in favor of having the officer testify merely that he had "received
information" before taking subsequent action.189 But even that simple
expedient is problematic. One court prefers it because that court
believes testimony that does "not itself quote or paraphrase the
declarant's statements" even if "the jury would necessarily infer that the
declarant had said X" does not violate the Confrontation Clause.90
Other courts concede that such testimony can violate the Clause, but
believe it less likely to tempt the jury to rely on the unconfronted
hearsay.9
The first argument simply ignores established doctrine holding that
hearsay proved indirectly is no less objectionable than hearsay proved
directly."9 The second argument falters because the assumption that
189. United States v. Cabriera-Rivera, 583 F.3d 26, 35 (1st Cir. 2009) ("[Tihe
government fails to show why the details [of the accomplice's] confession were necessary to
explain the investigative source .... [T]he government could simply have had the officers
testify that they discovered the evidence based on 'information received."'); United States v.
Maher, 454 F.3d 13, 23 (1st Cir. 2006) (officer should have been required to testify that he
"acted on information received" rather than report that he had been told by [the declarant]
that the defendant supplied [the declarant] with drugs); United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d
662, 677 (6th Cir. 2004) ("[Officer] O'Brien had merely stated that she 'had information'
about the Buchanan residence that led her to begin an investigation. O'Brien thus alluded, in
the vaguest possible terms, to the statements made to her by a [criminal informant]");
Sanabria v. State, 974 A.2d 107, 112-17 (Del. 2009) ("The trial judge [abused its discretion
because it] never considered whether that background explanation could have been provided
by simply referencing that Officer Garcia was acting 'on information received."'); State v.
Johnson, No. 34539-1-11, 2007 WL 1417312, at *5 (Wash. App. Div. May 15, 2007) ("It might
have been sufficient to elicit that the deputies acted on a tip, or that they received information
consistent with Johnson, without setting forth the details that [the declarant] spoke with a
prostitute and received a description of a pimp matching Johnson.").
190. Maher, 454 F.3d at 21.
191. Id. at 23; Sanabria, 974 A.2d at 114-15; Cromer, 389 F.3d at 677.
192. United States v. Figueroa, 750 F.2d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Check,
582 F.2d 668 (2d Cir. 1978); see also Cromer, 389 F.3d at 677 (testimony that "explicitly, albeit
not directly, informed the jury that someone had implicated [the defendant] in illegal
activities" implicates the Confrontation Clause; the officer testified that the defendant was a
subject of the investigation); cf Johnson, 2007 WL 1417312, at *4 (although the officer
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vague references to extrajudicial information are less prejudicial than
specific information is doubtful at best. First, as the Munoz court
realized, vague references to "investigative information" may move the
jury to believe that the police has evidence of "other crimes."" Being
told that it is hearing evidence of what the police knew so it can
understand why the investigation proceeded as it did, the jury's most
natural reaction to being denied the specifics may be to believe that they
concern wrongdoing not directly related to the current case. And even
courts that prefer vague references concede that investigative
background evidence suggesting other crimes is particularly
problematic."
Moreover, a concern that jurors will infer misconduct from
unexplained official actions is hardly dispelled by testimony from
officials that they acted on unspecified information. Jurors satisfied that
easily can undoubtedly be trusted to follow the instructions to focus on
the proof of the crimes' commission, not the legality of the investigators'
conduct, eliminating the need for the proof at all. In fact, drawing
jurors' attention to the propriety of the investigators' conduct by
allowing the prosecution to establish that it had unspecified information
can create the need for more specific proof to dispel doubts about
whether the information withheld was sufficient to justify the
subsequent action. In one case, for example, the court first suggested
allowing police officers to testify that when they arrested the defendant,
they were acting "on a tip" and then, apparently on second thought,
suggested allowing them to say "that they received information
consistent with [the defendant]." 95 But if the reason why the police
officers acted as they did is really an issue, how can one stop short of
allowing them to tell the whole truth-that an officer received a
description of the defendant and his car from a prostitute who said he
was her pimp? And if it is not enough of an issue for the officer to fully
report his reason for stopping the defendant in his car, why is it
admissible at all? Meanwhile, holding the specific information
admissible is, of course, no improvement on the vague reference to
unspecified wrongdoing. The same courts that hold references to other
testified to information received from another officer, "it was clear" that the second officer
relayed the declarant's description of the defendant).
193. State v. Munoz, 949 A.2d 155, 160 (N.H. 2008).
194. Sanabria, 974 A.2d at 112.
195. Johnson, 2007 WL 1417312, at *5.
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crimes are particularly prejudicial find similarly damaging statements
"relat[ing] to an element of the charged offense."""
Thus, even those courts that have endorsed the "information
received" alternative have required it only when more specific
information is "not necessary" to explain the investigator's conduct, by
which they often seem to mean that the specific information has no
logical connection at all to investigators' subsequent conduct. For
example, in one case, the court allowed proof that the officers had
information about drug use on the premises they searched, but not
evidence that they were looking for the defendant, because it did not
affect their subsequent conduct by, for example, explaining his arrest or
the search of his room.' 9  In another, the court found error where
evidence purporting to explain an officer's actions was unknown to him
when he acted.198 What purports to be a balancing test for excluding
insufficiently probative or unduly prejudicial hearsay often turns out to
be merely a way of excluding the details of statements that are not even
relevant to explain the investigators' conduct.'9 In many cases, the only
consequence will be for prosecutors to be more careful about selecting
the officer whose actions could have been affected by knowledge of the
hearsay declarations-for example, the arresting officer who can act
upon all the information generated by the investigation up to that point.
Meanwhile, the courts weighing evidence that has some logical
relevance as explanatory proof unwittingly demonstrate that the
Confrontation Clause problem cannot be balanced away. One court, for
example, purported to find the evidence inadmissible "because it
provided the primary evidence relevant" to an element of the charged
crime." But the evidence violated the Confrontation Clause if the jury
used it for its truth, despite how critical; the latter circumstance might
affect whether its admission was harmless error or whether the court
should have dismissed the charge for insufficient proof. Meanwhile,
196. Sanabria, 974 A.2d at 112.
197. Cromer, 389 F.3d at 677.
198. United States v. Silva, 380 F.3d 1018, 1020 (7th Cir. 2004).
199. See, e.g., United States v. Cabriera-Rivera, 583 F.3d 26, 34-35 (1st Cir. 2009). In
that case, the court found (1) that admission of context evidence violated the Confrontation
Clause because detailed testimony about the amounts that accomplices admitted to receiving
in the robbery "bore no relevance" to the defendant's investigation and (2) that one
accomplice's confession provided no investigative leads. Id.
200. Sanabria, 974 A.2d at 116; see also Cromer, 389 F.3d at 677 (evidence implicated the
defendant in a way that went to the heart of the prosecution's case); Cabriera-Rivera, 583
F.3d at 35 (evidence was "the sole basis for the government's argument" that the defendant
"went to hide" with the accomplice because "[t]hey wanted to have an alibi").
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believing that more was required to explain the evidence's exclusion, the
court fell back onto claiming that the jury likely misused the proof only
because the prosecutor did so in his opening statement and closing
argument.'O° But given the court's concession that the reason why the
officers arrested the defendant was relevant, the line between using the
declarant's statements to show why "the deputies conclude[d the
defendant] was the pimp" and why the jury should so conclude was
nonexistent.' Other cases purporting to analyze the evidence's
prejudicial effect often reach a similar conclusion: there is insufficient
basis to reverse admission of the evidence unless there is an additional
error, such as omission of a limiting instruction or improper use of the
evidence by the prosecutor.
20 3
At the end of the day, the balancing test devolves into an ad hoc test
focused more on the actions of the prosecutor and the trial judge than
on the conceded impact on the defendant's confrontation right of
evidence whose impermissible inference is the only one relevant to the
jury's charge.2' It gives the prosecution every reason to think that if
they "do it right," they are entitled to get before the jury evidence that
helped persuade investigators of the defendant's guilt, even though the
jury is not allowed to rely on it for that purpose. However well-
intentioned the balancing approach may be, it serves mostly to
perpetuate the fiction that explanatory evidence is "surely relevant"2 5
because it "arguably provides some assistance to the jury in
understanding the background of the case. ' , 201 Indeed, this fiction can
assure that the balancing approach, even as applied by a sympathetic
court, can perpetuate the error that it purports to alleviate.
201. State v. Johnson, No. 34539-1-1, 2007 WL 1417312, at *5 (Wash. App. Div. May 15,
2007).
202. The court said that "the prosecutor in this case clearly relied on the descriptions as
proof that the person described was the pimp," though it described her comments as
addressing what led the deputies to so conclude, not what should persuade the jury. Id.
203. Sanabria, 974 A.2d at 120 (evidence admitted without a limiting instruction);
United States v. Maher, 454 F.3d 13, 23 (1st Cir. 2006) (spontaneous limiting instruction
prevented admission of evidence from being plain error); Silva, 380 F.3d at 1020-21
(improper argument and no limiting instruction).
204. Maher, 454 F.3d at 23 (stating that the dividing line is between "true background to
explain police conduct" and "an attempt to evade Crawford," and warning the prosecutor
against "backdoor attempts to get statements by non-testifying confidential informants before
the jury").
205. Id.
206. United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 677 (6th Cir. 2004).
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In United States v. Hinson,0 for example, the court set out to
prevent admission of out-of-court statements inadmissible for their truth
as background or context evidence, unless they were "necessary to
explain the government's subsequent actions."' It held that allowing a
detective to testify that she investigated Hinson because she heard that
he supplied another target with drugs was error. But the court's
reasoning unwittingly guaranteed that the practice of admitting such
evidence will continue unabated.
The court began by making a fatal mistake that should be familiar by
now. It conceived that the necessity of the explanatory proof is
measured by its allowing "the government ... to tell a coherent story
about its investigation," not a coherent story about the defendant's
commission of the crime.2° Having decided to measure materiality by
the evidence's connection to the investigation's progress rather than to
the elements of the crime, the court was forced to conclude that out-of-
court statements implicating the defendant will typically be admissible
non-hearsay evidence to explain why he was investigated. It just so
happened that the government in Hinson had already introduced
another out-of-court statement accusing Hinson that made it "perfectly
clear" why the police focused their investigation on him. Thus, that the
detective also heard from another source that Hinson was a drug
supplier was "completely unnecessary to explain the police's subsequent
actions."21
As if by alchemy, the protective balancing test becomes a per se rule
guaranteeing admission of "ample admissible evidence" of at least one
out-of-court accusation to show why the police investigated the
defendant, even if he never claims that he was improperly targeted.
Before embarking on this analysis, the Hinson court observed,
"Ascertaining the purpose evidence serves, while essential to a
determination of whether it constitutes inadmissible hearsay or
admissible background information, is not an easy task. 21' The
difficulty in this case, however, is simply the result of a self-inflicted
wound created when the court, like so many others, confused the
importance of the story of the investigation with the story of the
defendant's criminality as told through admissible evidence.
207. 585 F.3d 1328 (10th Cir. 2009).
208. Id. at 1336.
209. Id. (emphasis added).
210. Id.
211. Id.
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Absent the defendant's claim that the police acted improperly, and
considering that we do not ask jurors to decide whether they did, why is
it relevant, much less necessary, to show why the police suspected the
defendant at a cost to the Sixth Amendment, a cost that courts generally
acknowledge? If we look to the few courts that have addressed the
question, we find this explanation:
The non-hearsay evidentiary function of testimony
about a police radio call is to provide a "background"
explanation for the testifying officer's actions-that is, to
explain what the officer was doing at the scene. The jury
need not.., be led to believe that officers responding to
a report of criminal activity just "happened by." Neither,
however, may the other officers relate the contents of
that report if the same contextual explanation could be
adequately conveyed by the statement that the officer
was responding to "information received.
2 12
But why is it any more misleading to ask the officer in the first instance
to omit mentioning the radio call than to ask any witness to omit
inadmissible evidence whose exclusion invariably interrupts the flow of
events as they unfolded? In any event, what would be the harm if the
jury did imagine that the police just "happened by?" Surely that would
not adversely affect the jury's deliberation in any way, much less justify
violating the defendant's confrontation rights. The only possible harm
would be if the jury were to conclude that the prosecution engaged in
misconduct sufficient to justify an acquittal despite finding proof beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime.
The likelihood of such an eventuality occurring sub rosa-that is,
contrary to instruction and without the defendant arguing government
misconduct and thus justifying admission of the explanatory evidence-
is exceedingly remote. Consequently, allowing the jury to think that
officers just happened upon the scene does nothing to mislead the jury
with respect to issues before it. Apart from whether that remote
possibility justifies risking evidentiary error, it surely does not justify
unnecessarily admitting testimonial hearsay whose use violates the
Confrontation Clause. Such hearsay should not be admitted at all until
the defendant challenges the propriety of the investigation. Only then
212. United States v. Price, 458 F.3d 202, 208 (3d Cir. 2006). Of course, if defense
counsel seeks to exploit the omission of the radio call by saying something on cross-
examination such as, "So you just happened by the scene and arrested my client for no
reason," he would open the door to evidence explaining how the officer came to be there.
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should it be admitted for a limited purpose, requiring courts to give a
limiting instruction and also to consider whether other expedients, such
as redaction, better satisfy the need to rebut the defendant's claims
without unduly infringing the defendant's confrontation right.
Thus, admission of testimonial hearsay to justify investigators'
actions should be a violation of the Confrontation Clause, unless the
defendant first interjects the issue. Without such a clear constitutional
rule, there will be no hope of preventing the supposed non-hearsay use
of testimonial hearsay from undermining Crawford. That is not to say
that every violation will amount to reversible error; some errors will
undoubtedly be harmless. But without the rule, even well-meaning
expedients only serve to perpetuate a practice that assures that the Sixth
Amendment will be honored in the breach.
VI. CONCLUSION
Crawford's historical analysis of the Confrontation Clause requires
that testimonial hearsay inadmissible at the Founding be inadmissible
today without confrontation. Hearsay, as defined by the common law
during the Founding era, did not exclude nonassertive conduct as
Federal Rule 801 excludes it today. Consequently, although defined as
non-hearsay by the Federal Rules, testimonial, nonassertive conduct is
inadmissible without confrontation. To satisfy this requirement with
minimal disruption, evidence rules should redefine hearsay according to
the declarant-centered definition that includes all out-of-court
statements whose probative value implicates the declarant's credibility.
Changing the statutory rule will familiarize courts and counsel with the
definition of hearsay that the Constitution requires them to apply when
prosecutors offer out-of-court, testimonial statements against criminal
defendants. Different jurisdictions can then choose whether to adopt a
hearsay exception for nonassertive conduct, which will apply to all
hearsay besides testimonial hearsay offered against criminal defendants.
To make the expanded confrontation right meaningful for
testimonial, nonassertive conduct and other testimonial hearsay, courts
also need to establish a constitutional rule holding that prosecutors
cannot offer testimonial hearsay for the non-hearsay purpose of
explaining or justifying the actions of investigators, unless the defendant
questions the propriety of the investigation. Courts currently allow
prosecutors to exploit that rubric by routinely admitting testimonial
hearsay to explain actions that the defendant has not questioned. By
admitting the proof, courts have sanctioned an easy end run around the
Confrontation Clause that a "not for the truth of the matter asserted"
[93:14151472
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limiting instruction does not block. Courts that admit testimonial
hearsay, supposedly to justify investigatory steps about whose propriety
there is no contest, invite juries to misuse the evidence to buttress the
prosecution's case. Having been told that there is a permissible use for
the proof, juries are certain to accept the judge's unwitting invitation to
violate the Confrontation Clause by confusing the significance of
evidence available to investigators and admissible at trial on the issue of
the defendant's guilt.
The common law's definition of hearsay includes nonassertive
conduct and prohibits the use of testimonial hearsay to show its effect
on investigators, unless it is needed to rebut an express or implied
charge of investigative impropriety. Without a firm appreciation for the
common law's definition of hearsay, which includes nonassertive
conduct, and for the true use of testimonial hearsay for its effect on
investigators, which prohibits its use entirely unless to rebut a charge of
investigative impropriety, Crawford's mandate will remain unfulfilled.
* * *
